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“What we’ve got here is . . . failure to communicate.”1

Tax comparatists tend to bemoan the grim status of their chosen field. Complaints are
aimed both at the scarcity of decent comparative legal tax scholarship, and at the lack of
a theoretical foundation for the study of comparative tax law. The purpose of this Article
is to portray a more sanguine, yet critical, view of this field. Sanguine, since a
sympathetic reading of contemporary comparative tax scholarship demonstrates that
there is more than enough such scholarship to generate a lively debate on comparative
tax works and their methodologies. Critical, since all of these works fail to produce even
the faintest form of paradigmatic discourse. The result is that contemporary academic
literature in comparative tax law contains strongly conflicting arguments, running
parallel courses, without ever engaging each other. In this Article, I try to construct a
framework for a coherent and vigorous academic discourse on comparative taxation. I
do so by placing existing comparative tax scholarship in the context of pivotal debates
within general comparative law, and point out the abundant contradicting arguments in
the field of comparative tax law. One cannot help but wonder how is it that tax
comparatists have failed to support or rebut each other's positions. One possible reason
for this lack of engagement is perhaps that it enables tax comparatists to rest comfortably
in the warm confines of their own scholarship without being bothered by questions
regarding their methodological—and consequently their ideological—stances. Finally,
for the sake of a debate, I offer my own views by responding to a recent article authored
by Carlo Garbarino.
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INTRODUCTION
An occasional reader of comparative tax scholarship would quickly learn that tax
comparatists tend to bemoan the grim status of their chosen field of study. Notable
commentators repeatedly express their frustration with the “sparsity of general literature”
in comparative taxation,2 the “dearth of good comparative tax studies,”3 and the
“marginal role” played by the “comparison of national tax systems” in academic
scholarship.4 The faultfinding, however, goes beyond complaining about the leanness of
scholarly literature. Tax comparatists point to the seemingly ever-primordial stage of
scholarship—a stage from which the field apparently is not able to extract itself. One
prominent scholar recently noted the lack of any "comprehensive attempt to develop an
academic discipline of ‘comparative taxation’ or 'comparative tax law'."5
The purpose of this Article is to draw a more sanguine, yet critical, picture of
comparative tax studies. Sanguine, since a careful reading of contemporary comparative
tax scholarship demonstrates that there is more than enough such scholarship to generate
a lively debate about comparative tax works and their methodologies. Critical, since all of
these works fail to produce even the slightest form of paradigmatic discourse. The “nondevelopment” that tax comparatists complain about is largely of their own doing (or
rather, non-doing). The real and acute problem with comparative tax studies is not the
lack of good comparative tax works, but the utterly absent academic discourse about it.
This point can easily be illustrated by looking at the two so-called "canonic"
2

VICTOR THURONYI, COMPARATIVE TAX LAW 6 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2003).
Michael A. Livingston, Law, Culture, and Anthropology: On the Hopes and Limits of Comparative Tax,
18 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 119, 119 (2005) [hereinafter Livingston, Law, Culture, and Anthropology].
4
Carlo Garbarino, An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative Taxation: Methods and Agenda for
Research, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 677, 679 (2009) [hereinafter Garbarino, An Evolutionary Approach to
Comparative Taxation].
5
Id.
3
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texts6 in comparative tax scholarship. These texts have achieved such a hallowed status
that one could not find a comparative tax article failing to cite them. Yet, both of these
texts say almost nothing about the theoretical framework on which they are based. So
how is it that they have achieved such unprecedented esteem? How can two works that
have almost no theoretical foundation become canons? The answer is that tax
comparatists simply did not have anything better at their disposal. While this provides a
practical justification for the extensive reliance on these texts, it also calls for some
serious reflection on the part of tax comparatists.
Yet, the assertion that there were no attempts to develop a theoretical framework
for comparative tax law is factually wrong. The problem is rather that such attempts were
usually ignored by everybody except their own authors. In fact, crude attempts to tackle
issues of comparative tax methodology were made and even debated as early as the late
nineteenth century.7 Somewhat more refined endeavors to address the scope, purpose,
and methodology of comparative legal tax studies appeared in the 1950s,8 while recent
years have seen several sophisticated investigative efforts with regard to these issues. 9
Still, when it comes to issues of meta-comparative taxation, tax comparatists rarely cite,
6

HUGH AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS (2d ed.,
Kluwer Law Int’l 2004) (1997); T HURONYI, COMPARATIVE TAX LAW, supra note 2.
7
Edward Atkinson, The Relative Strength and Weakness of Nations, THE CENTURY ILLUSTRATED
MONTHLY MAGAZINE, Apr. 1887, at 613. This article ignited a fierce methodological debate. It must be
mentioned however, that most of the debate evolved around fiscal, rather than legal issues. See, e.g., Henry
B. Gardner, Comparative Taxation, SCIENCE, Mar. 25, 1887, at 296; Edward Atkinson, Comparative
Taxation, SCIENCE, Mar. 11, 1887, at 214; Henry B. Gardner, Comparative Taxation, SCIENCE, Mar. 4,
1887, at 218.
8
John C. Chommie, A Proposed Seminar in Comparative Taxation, 9 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 502 (1957); John C.
Chommie, Why Neglect Comparative Taxation?, 40 MINN. L. REV. 219 (1956).
9
See, e.g., Garbarino, An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative Taxation, supra note 4; Livingston, Law,
Culture and Anthropology, supra note 3; William B. Barker, Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax Law
to Promote Democratic Policy: The Example of the Move to Capital Gains Taxation in Post-Apartheid
South Africa, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 703, 703-16 (2005). THURONYI, COMPARATIVE TAX LAW, supra note
2, at 1-14; Anthony C. Infanti, Spontaneous Tax Coordination: On Adopting a Comparative Approach to
Reforming the U.S. International Tax Regime, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNT'L L. 1105, 1135-57 (2002) [hereinafter
Infanti, Spontaneous Tax Coordination].

3

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1404323

and almost never respond to, each other. Tax comparatists almost always start their work
from scratch, failing to use already existing supportive arguments for their own objective,
just as they simply ignore other authors’ contradicting arguments which they should
tackle if only to validate their own conclusions. In that sense, tax comparatists have fallen
victim to their own presupposition that comparative tax is marginal or non-existent. As a
result, the contemporary academic literature in comparative tax law contains conflicting
arguments that are not being acknowledged, let alone confronted. This non-discourse
allowed some comparatists to introduce their work as an objective, apolitical endeavor,
when in reality it is anything but apolitical.
The primary objective of this Article is to shake tax comparatists out of their
discursive coma. I shall try to set up an initial framework for a coherent academic
discourse on comparative taxation: its definers, terminology, scope, purpose, and
methodology. Such a frame of reference is necessary so that tax comparatists can
understand each other, arrive at a fruitful debate and, ultimately, at a qualitative
evaluation of comparative tax works.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I addresses the necessary question: what is
comparative taxation? Tax comparatists have usually neglected this preliminary task.
Thus, they are lacking a rallying point from which a discussion can be launched. Part II
briefly surveys common approaches to comparative law research in order to set the
suggested framework for the comparative tax discourse. Part III implements this
framework by placing contemporary comparative tax scholarship in the context of several
pivotal debates in comparative law. Part IV intends to jumpstart a discourse, using the
framework developed in Part III in response to Carlo Garbarino's recent article in which
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he promotes an “evolutionary approach” to comparative tax law.10 Part V concludes with
a call for further discussion.

I. WHAT IS "COMPARATIVE TAXATION"?
A. In General
With the exception of some rare examples (discussed below), tax scholars have
made no attempt to define "comparative taxation." Rather, scholars have chosen to
explain why it is important and how should it be done.11 It seems that for the most part,
tax comparatists just did comparative tax research without much thought about what it is.
It seems that the only attempt at the “what is it?” question was made by Victor
Thuronyi who introduced the question but mentioned only that “comparative law
involves more than just describing the rules of another legal system.”12 Along the same
lines it was recently argued that “we need to move beyond the idea that comparison is
just a special technique . . . but we should consider it as a separate discipline, strictly
hinged to a theoretical framework.”13 These definitions are of little help since they do not
explain what should or should not be considered part of this “discipline.” Still, they are a
starting point. By agreeing that comparative taxation is more than a “technique,” these
assertions present us with two possible answers to the “what is it?” question: first, that it
is at least a “technique,” but probably better called a method of research; second, that it is
also more than a method, presumably some sort of knowledge.

10

Garbarino, An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative Taxation, supra note 4.
See infra Part V.
12
Victor Thuronyi, What Can We Learn from Comparative Tax Law?, 103 TAX NOTES 459, 459 (2004).
After this single sentence, Thuronyi immediately turns to describe the "focus" of comparative law, namely,
methodological, rather than definitional, issues.
13
Garbarino, An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative Taxation, supra note 4, at 684.
11
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Even the novice general comparatist will immediately recognize the sustained
debate about whether comparative law can be labeled an "academic discipline."14 Some
commentators assert that comparative law is only a methodology for legal research. 15
Some go as far as to imply that, from a normative perspective, it should not be more than
that.16 Other, equally notable, commentators point to decades of incremental
accumulation of knowledge in the field of comparative law.17 They argue that
comparative law is now much more than a mere method of inquiry—it is “a field of
substantive knowledge.”18
This academic debate is closely related to our inquiry but completely ignored by
comparative tax scholars. Following the threads of this debate will serve two purposes:
first, it will provide tax scholars with an arena in which they can present the essence of
their comparative research; and second, I shall put forth the argument that comparative
taxation is a substantive body of knowledge, and not a method of research.

B. Is There a Unique Method of Legal Comparative Tax Research?
During the past two decades, methodological issues have been fiercely debated in

14

For a brief discussion on this long-lasting debate see PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A
CHANGING WORLD, 231-32 (3d ed., Routledge Cavendish 2007) (1999).
15
Just to name a few notable commentators: KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW, 2 (3d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1977) (asserting that "Comparative law is the
comparison of the different legal systems of the world"); W. J. Kamba, Comparative Law: A Theoretical
Framework, 23 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 485, 489 (1974) ("Comparative law is the systemic application of
comparison to law."); O. KAHN-FREUND, COMPARATIVE LAW AS AN ACADEMIC SUBJECT 4 (Clarendon
Press, 1965) (stating that "Comparative law—this has almost become a commonplace—is not a topic, but a
method”).
16
James Gordley, Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline?, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 607 (1998). For a brief
analysis of Gordley's article, see Ugo Mattei & Mathias Reimann, Introduction, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 597,
599 (1998) (arguing that Gordley's position "implies a strong normative claim: comparative law should not
be a separate discipline”).
17
Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth
Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 673-84 (2002).
18
Id. at 684.

6

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1404323

the context of comparative legal studies.19 Unfortunately, this debate has failed to
produce a coherent outcome.20 The only obvious result of this continuing discussion is
our inability to point to a single, commonly preferred methodological approach to
comparative legal studies. Instead, this debate shows that the word “method” is perceived
as “techniques by which comparisons are carried out. These techniques have thereby
acquired the status of separate methods.”21
This is an important conclusion for two reasons: first, it points to various existing
comparative techniques which we may or may not adopt for the comparative study of tax
laws. Second, assuming that tax laws do need a special methodology of their own in
order to be studied comparatively, it implies that there may be more than one adequate
method. Looking at the first issue, namely that there are several existing comparative
methods, we can immediately assess what is certainly not a comparative tax
methodology: when tax comparatists execute their research by using an existing
comparative legal methodology, they are not employing any distinctively new
methodology that could be labeled “comparative taxation;” instead, they are using one
of several available comparative law methodologies for the purpose of studying tax laws.
Several tax comparatists have specifically chosen this option. For example, Garbarino
defines his recent endeavor as an attempt to identify “the methods which can be used to
pursue comparative analysis” of tax studies.22 He portrays the process of comparative
taxation as one in which the first step is the “selection of methodological approaches,”23
19

For a recent outline of this debate, see Oliver Brand, Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent
Methodology Of Comparative Legal Studies, 32 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 405, 409-35 (2007).
20
Reimann, supra note 17, at 689.
21
Vernon Valentine Palmer, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology,
53 AM. J. COMP. L. 261, 263 (2005).
22
Garbarino, An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative Taxation, supra note 4, at 679.
23
Id., at 685.
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and then he adopts an existing methodological modus operandi of comparative legal
studies–the “functional approach.”24 In a similar view, when Ann Mumford describes her
objective as an attempt to “provide a cultural context for the laws of tax collection, within
a comparative . . . structure,”25 she specifically associates herself with the school of
comparative law and legal culture in which a scholar must identify and interpret the
“legal cultures” of the jurisdictions studied.26 Cases such as these are easy: scholars who
adopt existing methodologies are not creating new methodological approaches (nor do
they pretend to do so).
It is possible, however, to pursue the comparative study of tax law without
specifically adopting an existing method of comparative legal studies. This brings me to
the second point, namely, that there is a possible technique which is a uniquely fitted to
the comparative study of taxation (but inappropriate for other purposes) and therefore can
be said to be “a comparative tax method.” Here too, the existing unsettled debate on
comparative legal methodology provides an important tool. Even though general
comparatists have often refrained from outlining their methods of research, they have
addressed the issue of “what a method must include.” This debate envelopes several key
controversies: the purpose of comparison, its underlying assumption of similarities or
differences of the jurisdictions studied, the choice of objects to be compared, and the
specific technique to be applied for the purpose of comparison.27

24

Id., at 686.
ANN MUMFORD, TAXING CULTURE: TOWARDS A THEORY OF TAX COLLECTION LAW 1 (Ashgate Pub. Ltd.
2002).
26
See Roger Cotterrell, Comparative Law and Legal Culture, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 709, 721-26 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
27
Two good examples which thoroughly outline these pivotal issues in comparative legal studies are:
David Kennedy, The Methods and the Politics, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND
TRANSITIONS 345 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Mundy eds., 2003); Hiram E. Chodosh, Comparing
Comparisons: In Search of Methodology, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1025 (1999).
25
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These controversies point to the issues that a comparative methodology should
address.28 If we were to find a body of scholarship in comparative taxation that had
developed a novel process for dealing with these issues, then we could argue that there is
indeed a comparative legal tax methodology. But there is no such body of scholarship. Of
the major works on comparative tax studies all use methodologies that can be associated
with an existing school of thought in general comparative law. Once an existing method
is found to be satisfactory, there is hardly a need to take on the tormenting task of
inventing a new one. The conclusion is that “comparative tax law” is not a method of
research in its own right, but rather an application of "comparative law" methodologies
to the study of tax laws. This issue is further discussed in Part III below.

C. Comparative Taxation as a Substantive Body of Knowledge
At the most basic level, the process of comparison refers to the “construction of
relations of similarity or dissimilarity between different matters of fact.” 29 Such
comparison is meant “to encompass the search for new categories for understanding
relevant similarities or dissimilarities, or rethinking existing ones.”30 This, in essence, is
what is meant by “comparative knowledge,” namely, something more than a simple
juxtaposition of (tax) laws in different countries. It is knowledge which emerged from
such a comparison and which could not have been produced in a non-comparative
fashion. Interestingly, tax comparatists have been able to produce an impressive volume
of such new knowledge. Some examples will illustrate the point.

28

See infra Part V.
Nils Jansen, Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 26, at 205, 310.
30
Id., at 311.
29
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Perhaps the most impressive display of such knowledge in a single work is found in
the two-volume IMF publication, Tax Law Design and Drafting, edited by Victor
Thuronyi.31 The stated purpose of this voluminous work is to “provide nonprescriptive
drafting materials that cover the major choices to be made in constructing a tax
system.”32 It does so by drawing on the collective experience of numerous contributors
who drafted tax laws and advised on tax legislation for over two dozen countries over a
five year period.33
Thuronyi specifically mentions that the book’s new knowledge “represents an effort
to distill from our collective experience, and from the tax laws of many other countries in
the world, practical guidelines that can be used by officials of developing and transition
countries and by their foreign advisors.”34 Taking into account the tax codes of numerous
jurisdictions, each chapter deals with the various ways of addressing a specific tax issue,
as well as problems which may arise and their possible solutions. The result is “an
alternative to the model code approach to tax reform in developing and transition
countries.”35 Of course, such an outcome can be criticized on various grounds, beginning
with doubts about the technical accuracy of its suggestions and ending with assertions of
post-colonial paternalism.36 But it is hard to deny that it constitutes a new comparative
substantive knowledge which could not have been gained without the collective

31

INT’L MONETARY FUND, TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING I (Victor Thuronyi ed., Int’l Monetary Fund
1996) (1996) [hereinafter Thuronyi, TLDD I]; INT’L MONETARY FUND, TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING
II (Victor Thuronyi ed., Int’l Monetary Fund 1998) (1996) [hereinafter Thuronyi, TLDD II].
32
Thuronyi, TLDD I, supra note 31, at xxvii.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Miranda Stewart, The "Aha" Experience: Comparative Income Tax Systems, 19 TAX NOTES INT'L 1323,
1330 (1999).
36
Most reviewers were positive, e.g., Stewart, id.; Lief Muten, Book Reviews: Tax Law Design and
Drafting (Vol. 1), 14 TAX LAW INT'L 677 (1997); but cf. John Azzi, Book Review: Tax Law Design and
Drafting (Vol. 2): Comparing Income Tax Laws of the World, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 196 (2000).
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experience of its contributors.
Another example of new comparative knowledge in Tax Law Design and Drafting is
the taxonomy of legal “tax families.”37 Even though the classification of legal families is
a long established concept in general comparative law, and hence not a completely novel
approach (as Thuronyi admits),38 such a comprehensive classification was new to tax
laws when introduced by Thuronyi. Given the fact that the focus was income tax rather
than private law (the traditional focus of comparative legal studies), the result was a
slightly different taxonomy than the one established in general comparative law. The
concept of classification is regarded by its proponents as an essential part of the process
of comparison.39 Even if one takes a critical look at the notion of classification,40 it does
provide a rallying point for an important methodological debate. Whatever the case may
be, it is obvious that such typology could not have been brought about without the
comparison of multiple tax jurisdictions and hence, qualifies as comparative tax
knowledge.
A second instance of comparative tax knowledge, and quite a different one, is evident
in the works of Michael Livingston. In two articles,41 Livingston revisits the assumption
that globalization poses a threat to the ideal of progressive taxation, presumably since in a
world of increased capital mobility, the taxpayers paying the highest tax rates also have
the best capability to shift their income to low tax jurisdictions. Livingston looked into

37

Thuronyi, TLDD II, supra note 31, at xxiii-xxxv; see also THURONYI, COMPARATIVE TAX LAW, supra
note 2, at 23-44.
38
Thuronyi, TLDD II, supra note 31, at xxv.
39
John C. Reitz, How to Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 622 (1998).
40
See infra Part V2.
41
Michael A. Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, Changing in Tel-Aviv: Reflections of Progressive
Taxation and "Progressive" Politics in a Globalized but Still Local World, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 555 (2006)
[hereinafter Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai]; Livingston, Law, Culture, and Anthropology, supra note
3, at 124-29.
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what he defines as the “tax culture” of four jurisdictions (United States, Italy, India, and
Israel) and their handling of the progressivity issue. Livingston defines “tax culture” as
“the body of beliefs and practices that are shared by tax practitioners and policy makers
in a given society and thus provide the background or context in which substantive tax
decisions are made.”42
Obviously, tax culture in the way Livingston perceives it is a strictly local concept.
But Livingston's endeavor actually seeks to reach some general conclusions (“new
knowledge”) about the interrelations between global and local factors in the design of tax
policies. Such a task would be impossible if only a single jurisdiction were studied. In
that case, any conclusion would be relevant only to that specific jurisdiction. By contrast,
comparison of different local tax cultures allows Livingston to present an argument that
is somewhat more global in scope. Livingston concludes43 that local factors play a key
role even amid globalization. This leads him to a rather skeptical view of tax
convergence—an idea otherwise happily adopted by tax scholars.44 Once again, this
conclusion would not be possible if not for the process of comparison, and thus it
represents a form of substantive comparative tax knowledge.
These two examples are not random. Both Thuronyi and Livingston addressed the
methodological issues in very different ways. Both produced “new” comparative
knowledge, but Thuronyi did so by seeking out similarities, while Livingston identified
differences. Yet, they do not debate their methodological differences, obvious as they are.
42

Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, at 560.
Id., at 582-86.
44
See, e.g., REUVEN AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007); Garbarino, An
Evolutionary Approach to Comparative Taxation, supra note 4; Yariv Brauner, An International Tax
Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 259 (2003). But cf. Julie Roin, Taxation without Coordination,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61 (2002); H. David Rosenbloom, International Tax Arbitrage and the “International
Tax System,” 53 TAX L. REV. 137 (2000).
43
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This shows that substantive comparative tax knowledge can be generated even without a
methodological discourse. The bad news is that without such a discourse we are left
helpless when trying to evaluate the merits of the new knowledge acquired.

D. The Discursive Failure and its Significance
Throughout the years, tax scholars have made their own more or less meaningful
statements regarding the theoretical aspects of comparative tax law, but most have
refrained from addressing theoretical assertions made by their colleagues. This lack of
discourse is demonstrated in Table 1, which maps references to other tax comparatists’
works. X represents a complete disregard of a specific article or book. √ represents a
mere reference in the footnotes or bibliography with no substantive reference to the
specific arguments and √√ represents an actual response or substantive reference to
another article.45
Table 1
Citing
Cited
Chommie
1956
Chommie
1957
Barker
1996
Thuronyi
1996, 1998

Chommie46
1956

Chommie47
1957

Barker48
1996
X
X

Thuronyi49
1996, 1998
X

Thuronyi50
2003
X

Infanti51
2003
X

X

X

X

X

X

√
√√

Barker52
2005
X
X

X

45

Livingston
53
2005
X

Garbarino54
2008
X

X

X

X

X

X

√

Referrals to a scholar's own articles are ignored. The tax comparatists whose work I do discuss were
chosen based on two criteria: first, that they did address at least theoretical issues of comparative tax law;
second, that they can quite clearly be associated with a specific school of thought in comparative law.
46
Chommie, Why Neglect Comparative Taxation, supra note 8.
47
Chommie, A Proposed Seminar in Comparative Taxation, supra note 8.
48
William B. Barker, A Comparative Approach to Income Tax Law in the United Kingdom and the United
States, 46 CATHOLIC. U. L. REV. 7 (1996).
49
Thuronyi, TLDD II, supra note 31; Thuronyi, TLDD I, supra note 31.
50
THURONYI, COMPARATIVE TAX LAW, supra note 2.
51
Infanti, Spontaneous Tax Coordination, supra note 9.
52
Barker, Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax, supra note 9.
53
Livingston, Law, Culture, and Anthropology, supra note 3.
54
Garbarino, An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative Taxation, supra note 4.
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Thuronyi
2003
Infanti
2003

√

√

√√

X

X

X

Barker
2005

X

Livingston
2005
Garbarino
2008

X

As is evident from the table, “X” is dominant, which means that comparative tax
discourse is in short supply. Its absence is of profound significance. As long as tax
comparatists refrain from talking and responding to each other, comparative taxation
remains incapable of engaging in true evolutionary discourse. Hence, a discursive
framework is badly needed in order to transform comparative taxation into a meaningful
progressive field of study. Borrowing the words of Livingston, which were aimed at
another tax-related discursive failure, but which are just as applicable here: “A
compartmentalized discourse, in which various groups advance separate complaints . . . is
unlikely to produce needed changes.”55

II. A SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK

FOR

COMPARATIVE TAX DISCOURSE: SCHOOLS

OF

THOUGHT IN COMPARATIVE LAW
A. In General
Comparison is not at all unique to legal research. It is shared by most academic
disciplines. In that sense, comparison is a “parent discipline” with many offspring, one
of which is comparative law. According to the same logic, comparative law may be
regarded as a parent discipline for comparative research in specific legal areas, including
55

Michael A. Livingston, Radical Scholars, Conservative Field: Putting "Critical Tax Scholarship" in
Perspective, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1791, 1793 (1998) [hereinafter: Livingston, Radical Scholars, Conservative
Field].
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tax law. Thus, the first obvious source which may provide us with methodological and
theoretical structures for a discourse in our topic is general comparative legal studies.
This methodological aspect is the focal point of my Article.
Exploring the methods and reasoning used by tax comparatists in areas other than law
(such as economics and political science) should also provide valuable building blocks
for our proposed discursive framework. In addition, examining the discourse of
comparative studies in specific areas of public law other than tax (such as comparative
administrative law or comparative constitutional law) should add another valuable source
of insights. Yet, these two aspects of a theoretical framework are not explored here.
Instead, this part briefly surveys the main schools of thought in comparative legal
studies. Experienced comparatists will find this terrain familiar and are thus invited to
skip directly to the next part of the Article. Tax comparatists, however, should benefit
from the terms and methodologies introduced here, which I suggest should be used in
academic debates in comparative taxation.
Obviously, I cannot cover the entire breadth of discourse in comparative law. Still,
within each approach discussed here, I shall refer to several key issues, described by
Chodosh as the "why, what and how of comparison,"56 namely, the purpose, the objects,
and the technique of comparison. Only the most obvious representatives and arguments
are mentioned, thus omitting numerous scholars who have made important “middleground” contributions. Mentioning them all would simply lead us into too much detail.
Four comparative schools are surveyed below: The first is the Functional Approach
which rests on the assumption that different legal systems face similar problems.
Functionalists see the convergence of legal systems as a desirable. Their comparative
56

Chodosh, supra note 27, at 1032.
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project is thus aimed at identifying a common legal solution to a common social problem.
The second is the Economic Approach which starts with an assumption that there is a
competitive market for legal models. In essence, comparative economic research is aimed
at inquiries into the deviations of different jurisdictions from an economically efficient
benchmark. Third, cultural comparatists reject the functional assumptions of similarities
of social problems and legal solutions. Instead, they assume that law is part of a broader
cultural phenomenon. Each culture contains elements such as values, traditions, and
beliefs, which make it unique. This "differentiation of cultures" entails that the laws
(which are embedded in these cultures) are also necessarily different. According to this
approach, comparative analysis should be aimed at understanding the cultural, social,
political, and ultimately legal identities. Finally, critical studies in comparative law are
aimed at exposing the pretentious apolitical nature of so-called mainstream discourse in
comparative law and to suggest alternative discursive agendas. Such scholars argue that
comparative legal studies should be a “liberating project,” releasing us from the cognitive
cage of abstract relativist dichotomies which are wrongly perceived as "objective."
B. The Functional Approach to Comparative Law
Scholars in comparative law have suggested numerous objectives which may be
served by comparative studies.57 Yet, all the more specific goals can usually be reduced
to three main categories: "Understanding, reform and unification."58
Unification is an attempt “to reduce or eliminate . . . the discrepancies between
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49, 54 (1996) (arguing that the number of purposes that have been suggested is so great that it is very
difficult to “clearly to state what comparative law teaching is designed to achieve . . . .”).
58
Chodosh, supra note 27, at 1069.

16

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1404323

national legal systems by inducing them to adopt common principles of law.”59 Ideas of
unification (and harmonization) are strongly associated with the functionalist heritage of
comparative law, which dominated (and probably still does) comparative legal thought
during most of the twentieth century.60 Comparative legal functionalism rests on the
assumption that “the legal system of every society faces essentially the same problems,
and solves these problems by quite different means, though very often with similar
results.”61 In other words, if legal problems and legal outcomes are the same, unifying the
laws (as the means to solve similar problems with similar results) would save a lot of
headache.
Functional thinking advances a “functionally equivalent” approach to jurisdictional
selection. This means that we must select “comparable” jurisdictions, i.e., jurisdictions
which are at a similar level of evolutionary legal development. 62 For this reason,
classification is “the beginning rather than the end, a preliminary step designed to
facilitate the study of otherwise unwieldy body of information. It is a prerequisite to
thinking and speaking about the underlying differences and similarities among various
objects.”63 Zweigert and Kötz argue that classification provides us with jurisdictions that
are representative of large groups and thus with a natural choice for comparison.64 These
would be, as their rule of thumb goes, English, French, and German law, as each is
59
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considered to be a “parent system” of their respective legal families.65
Steeped in a nationalist tradition, the taxonomy of legal families naturally saw the
national unit as an object of both classification and comparison.66 This leads to an
obvious tendency to compare “systems” or “families,” or at least to compare the
“system's laws” as a part of a larger, well-defined, “whole.” This sort of comparison can
be regarded as “macro-comparison.” It should be distinguished from “micro-comparison”
in which the object is limited in scope to a specific law, process, or institution.67 Even
though the issue used to be a contentious one, today it would probably be difficult to find
a scholar who advocates micro or macro comparison as an exclusively favored approach.
Most scholars agree that the option to use either lends itself to the purpose of comparison,
i.e., that macro comparison is probably a legitimate approach for certain purposes, while
micro comparison is for others.
When it comes to the question of which laws to compare, the functionalist approach
asserts that only those that fulfill the same functions in their respective jurisdictions are
comparable.68 Zweigert and Kötz suggest their presumption of similarity as a heuristic
device: setting aside topics which are “heavily impressed by moral views or values”69
(such as family laws) and concentrating on “apolitical” areas of law (such as private law),
they “find that as a general rule developed nations answer the needs of legal business in
the same or in a very similar way.”70 In other words, when we compare the so-called
“apolitical” laws of two “developed” nations, it should not be difficult to locate rules that
65
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perform the same function.
Finally, once a purpose of comparison is embraced and the objects of comparison are
selected,

we must face the question of the comparative technique. The functional

assumption of similarities suggests that a comparative legal researcher should start by
identifying a specific practical problem and then investigate the way in which it is solved
in each of the jurisdictions compared (the “problem-solving approach”). Another possible
way to address such assumptions is to take an institutional view: namely, to inquire
which institutions in the countries compared perform the same problem-solving functions
(“the institutional approach”).71
Kamba suggested that an effective comparison should encompass three stages.72 The
first is the descriptive phase, in which the comparatist is expected to describe the “norms,
concepts and institutions of the systems concerned.”73 The second is the identification
phase, in which the researchers identify the differences and similarities between the
systems studied. The last is the explanatory phase, in which the reasons for convergences
and divergences are explained. Similarly, Zweigert and Kötz74 depict the comparative
research as a five-stage process.75 First, one must identify a problem in functional terms.
Rather than depicting a problem in its local context, it is perceived as an apolitical set of
social facts conceptualized in universal terminology. Second, the researcher has to choose
the jurisdictions to be compared. We already noted Zweigert and Kötz's rule of thumb in
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this regard. From here on, Zweigert and Kötz turn to an approach similar to Kamba's. The
third stage in their process is descriptive. The fourth stage is identification of similarities
and differences. The assumption of similarities leads Zweigert and Kötz to assert that, put
in functional terms, we should expect more similarities than differences. Fifth, there is a
critical evaluation stage in which the researcher must evaluate the solution adopted by
different jurisdictions and determine which solution is superior to others. While it
remains unclear which standards one must apply for such evaluation, it is obvious that
Zweigert and Kötz believe in the existence of a so-called “proper solution.”
Another example of the problem-solving approach is The Common Core method,
which is largely associated with Rudolph Schlesinger and the Cornell Project. In the late
1950s, Schlesinger launched a research project with the intent to “find the common core
of the law of obligations.”76 He formed a team of local specialists in the countries studied
and presented them with a “working paper.” The paper contained questions regarding the
legal status of the research topic in each jurisdiction. In order to overcome social and
cultural barriers, Schlesinger refrained from using abstract legal terms such as “contract.”
instead, the paper contained descriptions of factual situations. In what can be described as
the “descriptive phase” of Schlesinger's research, each participant was asked to describe
how the legal system in his or her home country would react to the scenario described. In
the “identification phase” the specialists were presented with all the jurisdictional reports
produced and asked to study them. They then met and discussed the reports in an effort to
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formulate, in “general reports,” major areas of agreement and disagreement among the
jurisdictions. Schlesinger's work did not try to provide explanations of these differences
or similarities, but was interested in reaching a consensus as to what the systems have in
common (the so-called common core).
One problem with Schlesinger’s approach is that jurists' reports alone cannot
possibly provide a full account of the law in a given country. Law is probably more than
what jurists say it is.77 Another problem is that it is a static observation of laws.
Schlesinger's method studies law at a given point in time not allowing for the description
of long-term legal processes from a comparative perspective.78 Such criticism became
the basis for the legal formants approach developed by Rodolfo Sacco.79
A formant of law “may be a group, a type of personnel, or a community,
institutionally involved in the creation of law.”80 These formants produce different kinds
of texts through which we can understand law. So when it comes to technique, we are
asked to start by looking at the institutions (formants) and their outputs (texts), rather
than at putative problems and their solutions as reported to us by local specialists. The
formants approach is aimed at identifying the differences among the documents studied,
directly challenging the assumption that the legal rules is a given system are monolithic.
After the differences in the texts are revealed, we can then reconstruct law as “a set of
interlocked documents used by professionals according to their personal or institutional
strategies.”81 Such an approach “makes it possible to keep the ambivalence and
77

Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, The Common Core Approach to European Private Law, 3 COLUM. J. EUR.
L. 339 (1997).
78
Brand, supra note 19, at 419-20.
79
Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 343
(1991).
80
Id.
81
Id.

21

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1404323

multiplicity of legal rules in each system at play in the comparison.”82
According to its proponents, the legal formants approach is especially useful for
the study of legal transplants,83 since its identification phase is aimed at exposing
differences in the sources of law. It “offers a picture of laws as bundles of transplants of
competing sources of law.”84 In other words, the formants approach sees comparison as a
historical science, and thus naturally serves the transplants theory which explains the
formation of legal systems in terms of the historical process of legal borrowings.85
The traditional common core approach and the formants approach heavily affect
contemporary practices of comparative legal studies. The obvious manifestation is the
previously noted Common Core of European Private Law Project (also known as the
Trento Project). This project also starts with a factual questionnaire much like
Schlesinger's work-paper.86 However, unlike the Cornell Project, the current
questionnaire contains questions which relate to the formants theory. For example,
respondents are asked not only to provide a description of the operative rules in the
countries studied, but also to address the role of meta-legal formants in these
jurisdictions.87 This project has been described as “functionalism in a revamped version ”
that brings in sharper awareness of the multiplicity of factors which must be taken into
account.”88

C. The Economic Approach to Comparative Law
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Some commentators categorize the economic approach to comparative law—
mistakenly, I believe—as an alternative to functionalism. In reality, however, it is a
functional approach taking a self-conscious ideological turn. Established by Ugo Mattei89
and others, it simply provides a criterion according to which we should judge what the
proper solution is: efficiency. Instead of asking which laws or institutions fulfill which
functions, it asks which do so in the most efficient manner. It starts with an assumption
that “there is a competitive market for the supply of law.”90 Legal transplants, from an
economic point of view, are actually a competitive circulation of legal models, a process
in which only efficient models survive, hence leading to convergence.91 In essence,
comparative economic research is aimed at inquiries into the deviations of different
jurisdictions from an economically efficient benchmark: a so-called “model legal
institution.”92

D. The Cultural Approach to Comparative Law
To be practical, the assumption that different jurisdictions face similar problems
forces functional comparatists to define their compared problems in similar terms.
However, it is just as possible to assume that different cultural contexts ascribe different
moral values to similar factual patterns. What is seen as a problem in one place is not
necessarily a problem elsewhere. Also, the functional assumption of similar legal
outcomes naturally invites the researcher to concentrate on similarities, ignoring cultural
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and social differences, thus reducing significant differences to terminological abstracts
which may well seem similar, but in reality are not.93
Thus, cultural comparatists see law as a part of a broader cultural phenomenon.94
Each culture contains “non-rule” elements such as values, traditions, and beliefs, which
give each culture its uniqueness. This differentiation of cultures entails that the laws
(which are embedded in these cultures, or express them) are necessarily different. 95 Thus,
rather than looking for similarities, cultural comparatists concentrate their research on a
quest for differences.
Accordingly, cultural comparatists note that an agenda of unification calls, by
definition, for the annulment of cultural identity as expressed in the unique laws of a
given society. Writings in comparative legal culture have long celebrated (or urged that
we should celebrate) the virtue of “difference,”96 since difference “satisfies the need for
self-transcendence.”97 Merryman noted that “when the forces of unification threaten
what gives a people its cultural identity, it is time we draw back and reconsider.”98 On the
practical level, some cultural comparatists argue that even if for some reason desirable,
unification is an unattainable goal, noting that “‘Uniformity,’ in the sense of a
‘commonality’ across laws, is a promise that law is simply ontologically incapable of
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fulfilling.”99 For example, they take a rather skeptical stance towards legal transplants. In
Legrand's view, legal cultures are unique so that, “what can be displaced from one
jurisdiction to another is, literally, a meaningless form of words . . . because, as it crosses
boundaries, the original rule necessarily undergoes a change that affects it qua rule."100
According to this approach, a law which is, as suggested by Zweigert and Kötz, not
“impressed by moral views,” simply does not exist. Assuming that laws can be free from
moral content, is not only assuming the impossible, it also essentially strips law from all
that is interesting for the sake of reducing it to a quasi-biological, neutral phenomenon.101
Even if we accepted such a view, the obvious outcome of choosing a non-political realm
of law as an object of comparison is the total removal of public law from the comparative
discourse.102 This would have profound implications for taxation as a branch of public
law. Thus, taken at face value, the functionalist approach simply cannot serve us to study
comparative taxation.103 Moreover, it was argued that law is by definition a phenomenon
strictly embedded in political considerations, and furthermore, even the very choice of
laws to be compared cannot be regarded as

objective and free from political

implications.104 Rather, the choice of laws to compare is seen as a normative (even
ideological) argument about things that matter.
Nevertheless, comparative culturalists do not intend to abandon comparative law all
together, but rather to change its objectives. Instead of pursuing the unification of laws,
they promote the understanding of the legal identities in order to maintain and appreciate
99
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differences among legal cultures.105 Understanding is an attempt “to understand the
nature of law and legal change in both foreign (and by reverse projection) domestic
environments.”106 It must be emphasized that understanding is not only an explanatory
factor in the interpretation of legal systems, but a self-standing objective.
Like their fellow functionalists, cultural comparatists do not consider either micro or
macro comparisons preferable per se, yet, Chodosh does criticize the fact that
comparatists tend to divorce one level of analysis from the other. He argues that
“comparisons must be versatile enough to shift between the micro and macro level. If not,
comparisons risk falling into over generalization on the one hand . . . and extra-contextual
specificity on the other.”107 Cultural comparatists do attack, however, the heuristic utility
of classification used by functionalists, since—so the argument goes—a comparative
study with such classification misses the entire point of comparison. Ex ante
classification simply presupposes what we seek to achieve. Even worse, such taxonomies
tend to generalize, utilizing only a few factors of differences or similarities as their
criteria of classification.108 At best, classification should be the result of a comparative
study. 109
From a methodological point of view, a cultural comparatist would first have to
identify the legal cultures of the jurisdictions studied. But what are the components of a
legal culture? The answers to this question are at least as numerous as the number of
cultural comparatists discussing them.110 Indeed, “it seems impossible to specify the
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content, scope or power of legal culture with clarity.”111 Yet, Nelken categorizes cultural
comparatists into two major groups,112 exemplified in the Cotterrell-Friedman debate.
Roger Cotterrell suggested that cultural comparatists should adopt “ideal types” of legal
institutions, which he defines as “logically constructed concepts deliberately designed not
to represent empirical reality but to organize interpretation of it,”113 and to use them as
benchmarks for the identification of legal-cultural differences. The price to be paid by
such a methodology is the recognition that legal culture is not an empirically measurable
phenomenon.114 By contrast, Lawrence Friedman argued that the term “legal culture” is a
methodologically useful way of “lining up a range of phenomena into one very general
category.”115 From this general category we can then derive smaller, less general, and
more empirically measurable components.

E. The Critical Approach to Comparative Law
At the most general level, critical studies in comparative law are aimed at exposing
the pretended apolitical nature of so-called mainstream comparative law and to suggest
alternative discursive agendas. Critics often see mainstream comparative law as a
hegemonial-ideological project aimed at either assimilation or inclusion, culminating in
projects of harmonization.116 Instead, comparative legal studies should be a liberating
project, as suggested by Günther Frankenberg, releasing us from the cognitive cage of
111
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abstract relativist dichotomies (such as common law/civil law; Western/Oriental;
self/other), which are wrongly regarded as objective.117
Consequently, classification is perceived negatively. From a critical perspective,
classification carries with it what is known as “Eurocentrism.”118 The concentration on
European and other Western legal systems in the process of taxonomy has resulted in the
marginalization of non-Western systems. This, in turn, created an inherent bias in favor
of Western systems not only in the selection process of jurisdictions to be studied, but
also in the normative evaluation of what are “good/successful” systems. Critical legal
comparatists also object to the very idea of classification as a scientific tool. The
argument here is that classification “is inherently static by fixing, at least temporarily, the
objects of classification for purposes of their classification.”119 The concern is that preexisting taxonomy may “impede, or even prevent, any appreciation of change or variation
on the course of human and legal life and would therefore constitute a major obstacle in
human understanding.”120
In methodological terms, Frankenberg suggests a three-step approach to a critical
comparative study.121 Such legal study should start where other studies end: the
conceptualization of complicated social phenomena into abstract terms, which can be
fitted easily with a legal framework. Then, the comparative scholar is asked to
deconstruct the process of legal decision making, exposing the political interests
underlying the process. Once we are in clear view of the abstract “objective” legal
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framework on the one hand, and the underlying political interests on the other, the third
step is to re-introduce the legal process, showing how its discourse “ignores, marginalizes
or transforms.”122

III. TOWARDS A COHERENT DISCOURSE: COMPARATIVE TAX SCHOLARSHIP AS A SUBFIELD IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES

Admittedly, the idea of using the methods of comparative legal studies for tax
purposes is not new. More than three decades ago, Hugh Ault and Mary Ann Glendon
suggested adopting the theories of general comparative legal studies for the purpose of
comparative tax law.123 Yet, they stopped short of executing the idea. Notwithstanding
Ault's important contributions to comparative tax studies, he, like other tax comparatists,
never clearly harnessed a specific methodological approach to advance a specific point of
view. In this section, I utilize the discursive framework presented by general legal
comparatists in order to demonstrate where tax comparatists divide—but more
importantly—and fail to engage.

A. The “Why”: What is the Purpose of Comparative Tax Studies?
Most tax comparatists have, at least briefly, addressed the objectives of their field.
Many legal comparative tax scholars see their work as an essential tool for tax reform.
The differences among them concern the results that such reform is designed to achieve,
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and the sensitivity to contextual differences that such reform should take into account.
Some of the scholars take a clear-cut position within the general discourse of comparative
law. Others are not as committed, but they can still be quite easily associated with one of
the approaches described above. For example, they do not prescribe harmonization as an
ultimate purpose, rather, harmonization seems like a probable outcome of their approach.
Others stress contextual differences, taking a more relativistic approach. The bottom line
is that currently, all kinds of approaches, regardless of the purposes they serve—so it
seems—are "kosher." Apparently, tax comparatists are quite comfortable with this
situation since they do not bother to confront each other and their contradicting
objectives.
The easiest way to see this is by starting at one end of the spectrum. Probably the
most obviously functional tax comparatist is Carlo Garbarino, who in a recent article
explicitly adopts the functional approach and advances a functional assumption of
common tax problems.124 Nowhere in his article does he directly propose a practical end
to be served by his functional analysis, but he does offer five challenges for prospective
comparative tax research. Of these five challenges, the fifth provides us with more than a
hint of Garbarino’s comparative purposes.125
His fifth proposed challenge is to verify whether there is a potential “bottom-up”
predominance of a tax consolidation model to be implemented at the EU-level through
closer cooperation. Garbarino refers here to the European Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base Project (CCCTB).

In 2001, the European Commission “identified

corporate taxation across the European Union as one major obstacle to the achievement
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of a common market.”126 To address this problem, the European Commission launched a
project to eliminate double taxation of European corporate groups doing business in
multiple European jurisdictions. One of the possible approaches for such a project is to
apply an all-European, i.e., comprehensive, solution. Indeed, by late 2004 a CCCTB
working group began discussions with a view towards replacing “national tax systems by
a common tax base.”127 Garbarino specifically uses the CCCTB as an example of
comparative “common core” research and asserts that it may “reveal the existence of an
EU common model of tax consolidation on which agreement can be reached through
reinforced cooperation at the EU level.”128 In other words, such research should bring
about tax unification. In a later article, Garbarino specifically addresses the issue of tax
transplants in a corporate tax environment, and is a little clearer with respect to his
purpose.129 He argues that a comparative study of corporate taxation may present us with
“alternative policy choices in respect to the proper arrangement of fiscal institutions.”130
This is an ideological assertion, as it assumes that there is a “proper” solution (and if all
jurisdictions were to adopt it, it should lead—again—to harmonization.) In sum, it is not
unreasonable to assume that Garbarino views comparative studies of tax law as a tool for
reform leading to harmonization or even unification of tax laws.
Garbarino’s position stands in sharp contrast with that of Anthony Infanti, but never
engages it. To begin with, Infanti utterly rejects the functional approach as inadequate for
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comparative tax research. He argues that the failure of the functional method to place law
in its local contexts is especially acute in the case of taxation.131 Infanti also rejects the
assumption of similarity and the existence of a common core of tax rules, stating that
“[t]he inherently strong undulating nature of tax policy militates strongly against the
conclusion that there are absolute tax rules that may be ascertained simply by comparing
the systems of different countries.”132 However, he does not resort to abstract notions of
“understanding” as the purpose of comparative tax studies, but specifically advocates
such studies as a practical tool for legislative reform, albeit in a way very different from
Garbarino.
Infanti asserts that his method of comparative tax law “will not be employed as a
vehicle for achieving tax harmonization.”133 Rather, it is aimed at what he calls
“coordination.” Unlike tax harmonization which according to Infanti “would result in
each country having exactly the same tax system,”134 tax coordination includes “any
adaptation of one country's tax system to that of another.”135 Such adaptation can be
multilateral (by way of international agreements) or “spontaneous.”136 Infanti's
"spontaneous coordination" is a unilateral act of a country seeking to reform its tax
system in order better to accommodate legislative tax trends abroad. If we accept Infanti's
notion of spontaneous tax coordination, then obviously, in order to execute such reform
131
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successfully, one must take a comparative approach. If we want to be in line with foreign
legal trends, we should understand them first.137
Infanti explains his choice of comparative tax studies as a tool of tax reform in an
interesting way. He notes that “[t]he ensuing debate over how to reform the ailing U.S.
international tax regime has largely been shaped by the traditional concerns of efficiency,
fairness, and simplicity.”138 He further notes that “[t]he traditional focus on these
concerns may stem from the fact that they lend themselves to the theoretical analysis
preferred by commentators,”139 and he suggests that the reform debate should shift its
perspective. He believes that placing the reform debate in a comparative perspective is
needed in order to liberate the current discussion from its own parochial view.140 In other
words, he takes a truly critical stand here exposing the actual nature of the current
“mainstream” debate and suggests an alternative agenda.
As an example of his argument, Infanti discusses the tax treatment of contributions
made by domestic taxpayers to foreign non-profit organizations.141 Analyzing the tax
regimes in eight countries, Infanti shows that there is a wide variety of how such
contributions are treated, starting with their effective prohibition and ending with
generous tax incentives to induce them. Such a spectrum allows a prospective reformist
country to borrow an existing model from a wide array of models, taking into account the
unique characteristics of the reformed system and the context in which it is positioned.
That way, reform is induced through borrowing, without eliminating or ignoring
137
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contextual differences. In other words, Infanti maintains that reform through legal
transplants could be desirable, if it takes into account local differences. Unlike Garbarino,
for Infanti there is more than one “proper” solution. There are many legislative models,
and each is “proper” in a different context.
In a later article, Infanti specifically addresses the issue of legal transplants in the
tax context, calling it

“legal cloning.”142 In Legal Cloning, he probes the general

comparative discourse on legal transplants, illustrating it by the positions taken by Alan
Watson and Otto Kahn-Freund.143 As Infanti observes, both Watson and Kahn-Freund
advocate transplants as a means of reform, but with great differences in their attitudes.
Kahn-Freund's base assumption was that of difference, and hence he emphasizes the risk
of legal transplants being rejected due to their incompatibility with the social and cultural
contexts of the target jurisdiction. Watson, on the other hand, sees law as a largely
autonomous phenomenon with its own tradition and historical evolution. He regards legal
history as the most important factor in legal evolution, while Kahn-Freund puts the
emphasis on socio-legal contexts. Infanti notes, however, that both Watson and KahnFreund would probably agree that transplantation can only be successful if the recipient
system's legal environment is thoroughly studied in order to determine the form and the
extent of the adjustments the transplanted rule must undergo to be accepted.
In this context, Infanti seems to place himself more closely to Kahn-Freund, as he
believes that, due to their local contextual nature, the risk of rejection is magnified when
tax rules are being cloned.144 Based on these observations, Infanti proposes some “ethical
guidelines” to American tax experts who are advising transition countries on issues of tax
142
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reform.145 According to Infanti, such advisors should not abandon the idea of tax
transplants, but should use caution not to cause harm to the recipient system (which he
calls "the principal of nonmalfeasance"). One of the requirements is to tailor the cloned
rule to the specific context of the recipient country, in a sense, to avoid quasi-colonial
forcing of tax rules upon the target systems.
Another divergence-oriented view is apparent in the work of Michael Livingston. I
have already discussed some of Livingston's scholarship146 and noted that Livingston
starts with a presumption of contextual difference. Like some of the general legal cultural
comparatists, Livingston sees the study of comparative tax law as a hermeneutic process.
He argues that
[m]uch as comparative taxation inevitably requires a scholar to consider the
impact of cultural issues, the question of tax culture . . . leads inexorably to a
comparative perspective . . . Comparative studies are thus an invaluable tool for
discovering which features of one's own tax system are universal or "inevitable"
in nature, and which are culture dependent.147

Thus, Livingston views comparative taxation as a necessary endeavor to
understanding any tax system (including one's own.) For example, in From Milan to
Mumbai,148 Livingston concludes that, while different countries face similar issues, the
outcomes presented by their tax systems are significantly different due to local
considerations. Livingston seeks to understand how local factors may explain
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divergences in the concept of progressivity, and how such understanding can help us to
comprehend our own system.149 Hence, “understanding” actually achieves a practical aim
as it casts doubt on home policies which in turn may bring about discussion, reform, and
improvement.
In this regard, Garbarino and Livingston are at two opposite ends of the spectrum.
Garbarino sees harmonization and convergence of tax laws as an already occurring (and
presumably desirable) phenomenon. On the other hand, Livingston questions the
practicality of tax harmonization as well as its desirability. 150 He notes that differences in
tax systems are “not random, but relate to underlying differences in both the national and
tax specific cultures . . . .”151
Having sketched the two ends of the spectrum, there is still some middle ground left
to cover. As early as 1957, John C. Chommie was probably the first legal scholar to
address theoretical aspects of comparative tax law scholarship in a somewhat elaborative
manner.152 Chommie was best known for his scholarship in federal income taxation153
and for his authorship of a well-accepted treatise on this subject.154 But he was also a
frequent writer on issues of legal education. It is in this scholarly capacity that he
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presented a contribution which can be regarded as path-breaking. He even preceded
European comparative tax scholarship, which is usually regarded as more developed than
its U.S. counterpart.155
Chommie began his quest by counting the numerous values of legal comparative
work in general.156 Unfortunately, he then immediately stated that his purpose was "not to
reappraise these values in a tax context…."157 Yet, his work provides us with more than a
hint as to why Chommie valued the comparative study of tax law. -true, corrected -om.
We should start by noting that he was a supporter of functionalism, and specifically
advocated it as a method of legal education.158 In this context, the idea is to teach law not
only in conceptual legal terms (such as contracts, torts, etc.) but also in functional terms,
i.e., law as a response to specific factual patterns.159 In addition, Chommie proposed that
comparative taxation should be taught in U.S. law schools.160 In justifying his proposal,
he argued that comparative tax studies should serve policy makers when responding to
emerging needs of democratic communities.161 In sum, he was a functionalist who
advocated comparative study as a tool for reform. Yet, Chommie—while adopting
functionalism as a general approach specifically warned against simply accepting the
functionalist assumption of similarities.162 The reform Chommie advocated by the
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comparative study of tax law concerns something more (or something else) than the
harmonization or unification of tax laws. Chommie argued that:
The point to be made is simply this: As a condition to understanding other tax
systems, one must exhaustively re-examine one's own basic policy position; and if
comparative analysis does no more than stimulate such re-examination, it will
have served a valuable function in the training of policy-oriented lawyers.

Assuming “understanding” is a code word for sensitivity to differences, Chommie
reconciles his two ends in a way similar to Infanti’s. His bottom line is that comparative
study is needed to provide a choice among comparable decisions (rather than a single
“proper” solution) when attempting needed reform.163
Chommie's purposive thinking can serve as a natural link to Victor Thuronyi's Tax
Law Design and Drafting (TLDD). TLDD is a straight-forward example of the
comparable decisions Chommie sought, as it is intended to present alternatives to tax
legislators. Thuronyi himself sees comparative taxation as an instrument that provides
reference for prospective tax reforms.164 Taken at face value, it seems that Thuronyi sees
the betterment of tax reforms as the true purpose of comparative tax study, with no
special interest in whether such reform would lead to the unification of laws. As he
specifically states: “the purpose of a comparative approach is to learn about new
possibilities from studying actual practice, to convince by example, and to avoid

observation, the most pertinent in any study of tax-policy making”and that "the investigation of political
forces allows even fewer assumptions of similarity . . . .”).
163
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reinventing the wheel.”165 It remains unclear, however, what are—in Thuronyi's view—
the standards according to which one should judge the merits of a tax reform.
Yet, there are some aspects in Thuronyi's writing that specifically advocate
convergence. To begin with, Thuronyi sees a remarkable process of tax systems
convergence worldwide.166 He believes that different tax systems have adopted truly
similar rules, despite their different backgrounds. He also specifically argues that
“convergence by legal systems . . . is always something to look for.”167 It is not clear
whether this assertion is merely a methodological one (assumption of similarities as a
heuristic device) or a normative one (convergence as a desirable goal). In any case,
Thuronyi also advocates functionally-oriented research for the study of tax transplants,168
and in unearthing common tax principles when classifying countries into legal tax
families.This may imply a common core style approach.169
In yet another article, Thuronyi specifically accounts for the values of comparative
tax studies.170 These are: (1) they can provide another point of view which may help one
when reflecting upon one's own system; (2) they can teach us about the historical
development of tax systems and their convergence; (3) since tax “touches virtually all
phenomena of society,” by comparative study we are required to understand the legal
context; and (4) teaching comparative taxation can provide alternatives for solving a tax
issue.
It is fairly difficult to summarize Thuronyi's stance regarding the purpose of

165

THURONYI, COMPARATIVE TAX LAW, supra note 2, at 4.
Id., at 15-17.
167
Id., at 5.
168
Id., at 4-5; Thuronyi, TLDD I, supra note 31, at xxviii.
169
Thuronyi, TLDD II, supra note 31, at xxv.
170
Thuronyi, What Can We Learn from Comparative Tax Law?, supra note 12.
166

39

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1404323

comparative tax studies in terms of the general comparative debate. On the one hand, he
emphasizes convergence and historical approaches; on the other, he does not miss social
contexts and the understanding of differences. Yet, he does not reconcile these ends. It is
possible that Thuronyi is a victim of the discursive failure and thus is unable to produce a
coherent approach.
Lastly, I turn my focus on William Barker. Barker, like Infanti, attempted to portray
comprehensively the theoretical facets of a comparative approach to tax law171 and to
address the objectives of comparative taxation within this framework. One of Barker's
articles states his view regarding the purpose of comparative tax studies quite clearly:
"Expanding the study of comparative tax law to promote democratic policy" (emphasis
added).172 Yet, when formulating his objectives within the article, he seemingly adheres
to a sort of “grab bag” attitude:
Whether the audience is students, who want to gain a better understanding of their
own system, or students or practitioners who need knowledge of a foreign system
in an ever-expanding global environment, or legislators who wish to consider
foreign solutions for their own country, comparative tax law performs an
important role.173

Barker seems to pursue an even more general approach by saying that his objective is
“to create a view of tax law as a tool for human development.”174 This statement explains
little more than that comparative tax is “important.” To understand where Barker might

171

Barker, Expanding the Study of Comparative Law, supra note 9, at 703-12.
Id.
173
Id., at 708.
174
Id., at 711.
172

40

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1404323

be positioned in our framework, it is useful to note that he launched his comparative
endeavor through “examining [the] system's approach to the resolution of similar
problems,” which is the bread and butter of functionalism.175 But he also explicitly holds
the traditional functional approach to comparative law insufficient for the comparative
study of tax laws because this “largely analytical approach to law does not advance a
realistic view of law and thus does not promote comparative tax law's ability to advance
legal theory.”176 He does not seek to reject traditional functionality completely, but
rather to revamp it by giving it a clearly stated normative stance.177
Barker notes the existence of many differences in the particulars of tax laws and
argues that these differences can be “appropriately characterized as fundamental doctrinal
differences regarding the proper approach to the formulation of tax base.”178 Like Infanti,
he believes that tax transplants can be successful as long as their adaptability to local
cultural contexts is carefully considered.179 More than that, Barker's view is that
transplants are not only a means of importing possible tax solutions, but also a means to
spread desirable democratic values.180
Thus, Barker is best described as taking a middle-ground in this discussion though
leaning towards the functionalist “unifying” end. His idea is to respect differences while
promoting certain values (democratic ones) which implies that not all differences should
be respected equally. Also, if only certain values are to be advanced, convergence
175
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becomes a sensible outcome.

B. The “What”: Comparative Tax Law and its Objects of Comparison.
1. In General
There is no easy way to summarize contemporary comparative tax literature with
respect to its objects of comparison. The only distinctive feature is that tax comparatists
see the issue of variable selection in very different ways. Some include numerous
jurisdictions in their research in order to encompass a worldwide perspective in their
studies, while others find it sufficient to compare only two. Some see tax comparison as a
broad issue that necessitates a generalized observation of tax systems as “wholes,” while
others look at narrow issues specifically in order to avoid this generalization.
Surprisingly, such differences are seldom debated. As long as this silence persists we are
left with nothing but a mishmash of possible choices where each comparatist can
compare whatever he or she wants without the risk of being exposed to any criticism as to
the choice of objects of comparison and its possible ideological implications.
2. Which Jurisdictions?
One problem of the comparative tax non-discourse is that only a few tax comparatists
provide any explanation of their selection of compared jurisdictions. To begin with, there
is the question of classification into tax families as a basis for jurisdictional variables
selection: without a doubt, Thuronyi pioneered this issue in the tax arena. In two works
he elaborates his ideas of jurisdictional tax classification.181 However, Thuronyi admits
that his classification “largely tracks the classification of legal families by comparative
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law scholars.”182 Against such taxonomy, one could argue that it presupposes what it
seeks to achieve, since the existing taxonomy originates in comparative studies of private
law. So at the least it is questionable whether such a taxonomy is really helpful in
comparative public law research, such as tax law. Yet, in favor of Thuronyi's taxonomy
we can say that he notes some differences from the conventional classification which are
due to the fact that his classification is focused on income tax.183 Also, Thurnoyi's
taxonomy can be quite comfortably regarded as a result of years of experience as a tax
advisor, and thus an outcome of a realistic research rather than an ex-ante heuristic
assumption. Another strength that can be attributed to his taxonomy is the fact that he
largely avoids Eurocentrism. His taxonomy is truly global in nature, taking into account
dozens of jurisdictions.
Thuronyi believes that his classification can provide a head start for future
research.184 It seems that his primary criterion for classification is the level of similarity
of a specific country to a specific legal tax tradition,185 namely, the civil law tradition, the
common law tradition, or what he calls the European law tradition.186 Very similar to
Zweigert and Kötz, his classification leads him to suggest a rule of thumb for the
selection of jurisdictions which are representative of a larger tax family. He suggests
Germany, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom as natural choices for
comparison.187 Such an approach exposes him to criticism of ethnocentrism. It also
suggests that Thuronyi adheres to an assumption of jurisdictional comparability. After all,
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the reason to choose these jurisdictions, according to Thuronyi, is that these countries can
be regarded as “leaders in influencing the tax laws of other countries.”188
Thuronyi does explore other possible criteria for jurisdictional tax classification,
but rejects them. For example he suggests that we could classify tax systems along
economic lines.189 Such classification could be determined by looking at the size of tax
revenue and the components of the tax mix. This classification, Thurnoyi admits, would
probably result in a much different taxonomy than the traditional one. For example, it
would probably group together many OECD countries, despite their origins in different
legal traditions. Thurnoyi rejects such classification on the ground that it could prove to
be “misleading.”190 His reason is that the various systems may produce significantly
different tax mixes, which would put them in different classes, even though the economic
effects are the same. For example, “a country extensively using tax expenditures (e.g., the
United States) will show a lower tax share as compared with other countries (e.g., many
European countries) that accomplish the same policies with direct expenditure programs
whose economic effects may be very similar to those of tax expenditures.”191 This
example explains nothing more than Thuronyi's general tendency towards the functional
classification. The reason he rejects economic classification is that it prevents us from
discerning which tax laws or institutions fulfill the same economic function. This is
tautological reasoning which, simply put, rejects non-functional classification because it
is not a functional classification. Functionalism might indeed be a preferred criterion of
tax classification, but if so, Thuronyi does not explain why.
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With that background Barker's scholarship rings very different. Like Thuronyi,
Barker asserts that “the fundamental contextual starting place of comparative law is that
different nations belong to different legal families.”192 Yet, he immediately notes the fact
that the traditional classification is closely associated with scholarship in private law, and
thus may not provide equally important insights for purposes of tax law. Barker—in a
way strikingly different from Thurnoyi's classification—argues that taxation “does have
its own taxonomy”193 and suggests classifying tax systems according to their “defining
elements.”194 Those defining elements should be critically examined in order to
determine whether they help to promote the democratic values which, as you recall, are
the goals to be advanced by comparative tax studies according to Barker. Thus, we are
dealing with normative rather than functional criteria for classification. The “normative
underpinnings” of democratic taxation according to Barker are “equity, both horizontal
and vertical, and redistributive justice.”195 Of course, Barker’s unique criteria could be
criticized on various grounds. But given the objectives that Barker ascribes to
comparative tax studies, he is doing a much better job explaining his criteria for
classification than Thurnoyi does.
Barker's approach is evident in an earlier comparative study, published well
before he developed his classification criteria, in which he selected the United States and
the United Kingdom as comparatives.196 He explained then that both countries share the
“same general system of law” and thus offer a "natural comparison."197 But he also noted
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that both systems started with remarkably different tax systems and that a comparison of
strikingly different systems may “yield the greatest insight into the nature of legal
doctrine.”198 Loyal to his assertion, he later added South Africa to this equation, precisely
because it is a country at a very early stage of democratic transition, with a totally new
legal environment and tax system and because it thus offers a natural field of inquiry for
comparative tax study aimed at promoting democratic values. In other words, Barker
would probably reject the functional limitation which requires us to compare jurisdictions
with tax systems at a similar evolutionary stage.
Livingston's scholarship can be regarded as the most refined in this regard.
Comparing tax progressivity in the United States, Italy, India, and Israel, Livingston
admits that these countries were chosen in part because of his linguistic abilities, but also
on the basis of their “distinctive features.”199 According to Livingston, India, Israel, and
Italy “are advanced enough to have a sophisticated tax policy discourse, but each has
political and cultural features that renders its tax policy necessarily different from that of
the others and the United States.”200 Livingston virtually deconstructs the jurisdictional
“comparability” requirement of the functional approach into its two components. The
first is the requirement that the systems compared be at a similar evolutionary stage. To a
significant extent, Livingston accepts this requirement by noting that the jurisdictions
selected should be sufficiently “advanced” or “sophisticated” with respect to their tax
policies. The second is the requirement of functional equivalence of the laws being
compared. By noting the unique differences in the selected jurisdictions' tax politics and
tax cultures, probably as a prerequisite for obtaining comparative insights, Livingston
198
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rejects this requirement. In a sense, instead of showing how supposedly different laws
achieve similar ends, he shows how supposedly similar laws achieve different ends.
Livingston thus stands between Thuronyi and Barker. On the one hand, he would
probably support Barker in choosing a classification criterion which is unique to the
purpose of tax studies (tax cultures in Livingston's case) but on the other hand, he
acknowledges the necessity to consider developmental criteria as well.
Chommie suggested comparing the tax systems of the United States and Canada,
noting that the availability of Canadian materials in English is “of paramount
importance.”201 Luckily, Chommie left us with more than a mere technical lingual
consideration. Given the importance that Chommie ascribes to comparative studies as a
catalyst for reform of the home system, it is not surprising to find him arguing that the
primary substantive consideration in the selection of foreign taxation materials is “the
light that they may shed on the tax-policy-making process in the United States.”202
Chommie offers several reasons why Canada's tax system is a successful candidate to
shed light on the U.S. tax system.203 First, Canada—like the United States—is a federal
government. This would allow a critical examination of federal/state issues in the United
States. Second, Canada presents a markedly similar economic structure. Third, Canada
shares a common legal and cultural heritage with the United States. Fourth, at the time
when Chommie wrote his proposals, Canada was a vibrant arena of tax reforms and
professional tax-related activities, which in Chommie's view, transformed Canada into a
201
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more “mature tax community.”204 Thus Chommie, even though not a true traditional
functionalist, resorts to a very functional-oriented approach in the choice of jurisdictions
to be compared, especially when they share a similar background and similar level of
development.
3. Micro or Macro Comparison?
The question of the scope of tax law comparison also attracts strikingly divergent
views expressed by tax comparatists, yet they also go unchallenged. The most obvious
representative of the macro end of the spectrum is Garbarino, who argues that tax
systems should be studied comparatively as “wholes.”205 Garbarino makes his stand very
clear, but does not provide an explanation for his preference for macro comparison.
Barker, on the other hand, takes a similar position but does provide an idea of the reasons
behind such a choice. When studying comparatively the tax systems of the United States
and the United Kingdom,206 he explains that his inquiry seeks “to investigate the nature
and development of tax law through an examination of the general structure of two
systems.”207 Barker acknowledges the subjective nature of the choice of objects of
comparison, but also embraces it.208 Unlike Garbarino, he recognizes that there is no
macro level without a micro level and hence is not exposed to Chodosh's criticism aimed
at comparatists who tend to disengage one from the other.209 In order to characterize tax
systems at the macro-level one must do some “micro work.” Barker specifically notes
that his way of demonstrating the “general structure” of tax systems is by comparing
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specific topics which “were chosen due to the often dramatic way they expose the
fundamental nature” of the systems compared.210 The “micro-comparisons” to be
performed presumably correlate with what Barker later termed the “defining elements” of
tax systems. Such elements, he argues, “provide a critical structure for comparative
analysis.”211 A somewhat similar approach is taken by Thuronyi, who describes the
primary characteristics of numerous specific areas of taxation in order to “survey the
whole.”212
Infanti provides an opposite example regarding the breadth of comparison. Like
many other authors, he chose to compare a narrowly defined topic, namely the tax
treatment of contributions made by domestic taxpayers to foreign NGOs.213 Infanti's
justification for this micro-approach seems to be primarily practical, i.e., that a single
researcher would be unable to conduct a broad meaningful comparison. In light of the
complex nature of tax law, this is a good reason, but it is incomplete without an
explanation why one specific narrow area of tax law should be a preferred object of
comparison over others. Infanti's explanation for his choice is discussed below.214
Livingston probably provides the most elaborate account of the micro/macro
choice, and eventually takes a middle ground. He starts by categorizing tax culture
literature based on how broadly the term “tax culture” has been used.215 At one end of
the spectrum tax culture is used in a “macroscopic sense, to refer to broad beliefs and
practices and their impact upon the contemporary tax system.”216 The other end of the
210
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spectrum is “narrower in focus,”217 and “tends to use the idea of culture in an
unsystematic way.”218 There is also middle ground, which encompasses tax culture as an
expression of both a narrowly structured phenomenon, as well as broad cultural
attitudes.219 Livingston then applies this categorization to state his hypothesis.220 He
argues that broad cultural or historical tendencies are poor explicators of tax differences
as they tend to over-generalize. The problem with the comparison of broad perspectives
is that such perspectives are “filtered” through specific tax cultures to an extent that
eventually renders them unrecognizable. “It seems more promising,” he thus argues, “to
find explanation in narrower, tax related institutions or traditions–what might be called
the intermediate level between the overall national culture and specific tax rules or
institutions.”221
4. Which Tax Laws?
Two issues emerge when contemplating the tax laws to be compared: what qualifies
as a “tax rule” and—assuming we can distinguish tax rules from non-tax rules—which
tax rules should we compare?
The first of these issues, what is a tax rule, is closely related to the above discussion
of what is comparative taxation. Unfortunately, this question has also largely been
neglected by tax comparatists. Presumably, the question could be dismissed as a “nonissue” since “tax professionals speak a common language.”222 So, if a common language
for taxation does exist, we probably know what this language is all about. Such an
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assertion might be appealing and is not necessarily out of touch with reality. Yet, we
should be very careful when stating that we know what the field's unifying tertium
comparationis is, if the statement really rests purely on the claim that tax laws are simply
“there” and are expressed in a “common language.”
For example, an American tax comparatist would probably be quite comfortable
asserting that a comparison of the administrative powers employed by the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service on the one hand and by the Department of Zakat and Income Tax in
Saudi Arabia on the other is clearly within the borders of comparative taxation. However,
it would be much harder to find common tax terms which describe Zakat from an
American scholarly perspective. Under Saudi law, Saudi nationals do not pay income tax.
They are, however, subject to Zakat, which is charitable giving to the needy, required by
Islamic law. For purposes of receiving foreign tax credits, the IRS has determined that
Zakat is not a credible tax since it is not a “tax” in an American sense.223 So, is research
comparing income tax compliance in the United States with Zakat compliance in Saudi
Arabia research in comparative tax law? Or is it simply comparative law research dealing
with law compliance? Maybe a “common language” is more wishful thinking than reality
after all?
Thus, the “what is comparative taxation” question cannot be fully tackled without a
necessary discourse about the boundaries of comparative taxation. Presumably, such
boundaries will never be clearly defined, but a discourse should still produce some
defining criteria for our field of study. Defining what is “comparative” about a study is a
worn-out topic; defining what is a comparative study about “taxation”—not nearly as
much. Within the scope of this Article, it is not possible to develop a coherent and
223
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convincing argument as to what is a “tax law” from a comparative perspective, but we
can say this much: the use of terms such as “common language” or “comparable tax law”
eventually boils down to an acceptance or rejection of functionalism.
If we accept functionality as a suitable approach to the study of comparative tax,
we must discuss the most basic similarity of functions that tax systems are intended to
fulfill. Only the comparison of laws that share the most basic function of tax law can be
regarded as comparative taxation from a functional perspective. So what is this “basic
function”? Is it simply the generation of national revenue? If so, does the international
comparison of speeding tickets fines fall within the boundaries of comparative taxation?
Is it redistributive justice? And if so, does the cross-border comparison of social benefit
laws qualify as a study in comparative taxation?

To date, functional tax comparatists

have neglected the most basic prerequisite needed to define their field of study: what
basic function transforms a law into a tax law? Moreover, what if we reject
functionalism? What is the common ground then by which we define the “tax laws” we
compare? If we do not discuss such common ground, are we tax comparatists at all? Or
are we just comparatists who compare texts in which the word “tax” appears more often
than not?
Moreover, to date tax comparatists have engaged in the comparative study of
almost any field of taxation, from controlled foreign corporations (CFC) regimes to the
process of tax reforms in developing countries. As noted, a choice of topic may imply an
ideological perspective regarding the questions that tax comparatists should ask. Since no
criteria have been developed to decide which questions tax comparatists should ask, most
comparative tax articles simply focus on the specific area of interest or expertise of the
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tax scholar who writes them. In other words, we have no real way to judge which
comparative tax studies offer the most valuable insights, and which studies add only
marginal value to the development of the field. Two tax comparatists however, did
provide a somewhat detailed justification for their choice of tax laws.
When examining his theoretical framework, Infanti justified his micro-approach
to comparing the tax treatment of contributions made by domestic taxpayers to foreign
NGOs on practical grounds.224 But he added another justification which is purposedriven. The purpose is to show that reform and simplification of the Internal Revenue
Code can go hand-in-hand. Hence, he chose to compare this area of tax law, because it
“suffers from both the excessive complexity and the failure to keep pace with a changing
economy.”225 Naturally, such criteria advance his specific purpose, but can “excessive
complexity” and “failure to keep pace with a changing economy” also serve as proper
general criteria for the selection of tax laws to compare? Luckily, Infanti does provide an
answer to such questions in a later article—an answer which again posits him at the
critical end of the tax-comparison spectrum. Explaining his choice in retrospect, Infanti
admits that the issue of deductibility of cross-border contributions to foreign NGOs is
somewhat esoteric.226 He further explains that he chose this subject specifically for its
marginality, “because it was not a topic about which academics studying international
tax normally write.”227 Part of his purpose in doing so, he continues, “was to try to move
the international tax discourse beyond the usual subjects.”228 With this assertion Infanti
224
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acknowledges his critical view of comparative tax studies.
Another tax comparatist who convincingly justifies his choice of laws is Barker.
Barker suggests studying the “defining elements” of income tax systems:
Exemptions and tax preferences are the defining elements of a tax system and are
critical to the comparative study of tax law. Exemptions and preferences strongly
indicate whether the ideals of equity and distribution are being achieved by a
particular system because they are the sources of the vast majority of direct tax
transfers.229

Assuming we accept Barker's ideological stance—namely, that the purpose of
comparative tax study is to promote democratic values and that these values culminate in
a call for distributive justice—he makes a valid point as to the choice of tax laws to be
studied. If we seek tax benchmarks of distributive justice, we should certainly compare
tax laws that actually distribute, such as tax exemptions and preferences.

C. The “How”: Comparative Tax Studies and the Construction of Similarities and
Differences
1. In General
The act of comparison itself is supposedly a technical one, and hence apolitical. In
reality however, techniques serve particular purposes and cannot be detached from an
ideological stance. Even the most generalized blueprint of comparison would have to take
a particular shape when executed. One would have to decide which legal texts to read,
which non-legal sources to consult, how to interpret texts and data, and so on. All of
229
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these choices are deeply embedded in subjective views, which may be ideologically
affected.
This makes it quite obvious that there is no one-size-fits-all technique.230 For
example, the comparison of tax compliance cultures and the comparison of effective
corporate tax rates in different countries cannot be possibly performed in accordance with
the same standards and procedures, and it is doubtful that such comparisons can serve the
same purposes. Some would argue that the self-evident result is that—when it comes to
methodology—comparative tax research must resort to eclecticism.231 In my view,
however, complete eclecticism is undesirable. A coherent discourse would address the
question, among many others: which is more important to compare (tax cultures or tax
rates)? If an academic discourse marginalizes specific kinds of tax comparison and
emphasizes others, it would have to concentrate the methodological discussion on
techniques which are most relevant to the “important kinds” of comparisons. This would
make the methodological discussion significantly less eclectic. In case we should
experience a paradigmatic shift in the discussion, it is reasonable to assume that a
methodological shift would follow. In other words, in order to establish which methods
are currently most suitable for the purposes of comparative tax law, we should start by
developing a discourse on the purposes of comparative tax law instead of simply
resorting to eclecticism. As tax comparatists, we should commit to specific academic
purposes rather than proclaim that all purposes are equally important.
The following survey clearly demonstrates that different tax comparatists have
taken different approaches towards the process of comparison, from both practical and
230
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normative perspectives. The fact that they ignore each other's methodological stances is a
serious problem in comparative tax law research. Each tax comparatist conducts his
scholarship in his own intimate methodological bubble, free from outside critique. The
result is that tax comparatists do not reflect on their methodological practices and
ideologies. Taking a critical position, I would conclude that to date, legal comparative tax
studies simply lack “self-consciousness.”

2. Methodological Conflicts in Comparative Tax Law
Not all tax comparatists explain their purposes and choices, or their underlying
assumptions. Yet, even if they do not explain their technique, it can be determined by
looking at what they actually do. Thus, projects of comparative taxation often provide
examples of coherent methodological approaches, even though the author may not be
aware of it.
One such example is the annual Cahiers De Droit Fiscal International published
by the International Fiscal Association (IFA), which provides a comparative report on a
specific field of tax law in each of the two volumes published every year. From a
jurisdictional perspective the Cahiers provide a rather comprehensive analysis. Given the
sheer magnitude of the IFA232 and the central role it plays in the global tax environment,
the Cahiers certainly have significant effect on the very issue of “what is currently
important” in the tax world. In that sense they advance a particular kind of comparative
tax discourse. They are also interesting for another reason, i.e., the method by which they
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are produced. Every year, the IFA invites local specialists from around the world to
address a particular tax issue. These specialists are presented with a series of questions,
many times in the form of a case study. Each specialist produces a national report
summarizing his local jurisdiction's handling of such a case. The reports are presented to
a general reporter who compiles a general report summarizing the trends.233 In
methodological terms, this bears a strong resemblance to Schlesinger's Common Core
Project. For example, Masui, the general reporter for the second 2004 report that dealt
with a comparative analysis of group taxation, specifically presents his report in
functional terms.234 The report also concludes that there are four primary regimes of
group taxation and that each jurisdiction surveyed can be associated with one of these
regimes.235 Such classification brings forward the common core of group income taxation
for each “family” of jurisdictions.
Another example of such a common-core-like project in tax law is found in Hugh
Ault’s and Brian Arnold's work.236 Their book states its functional orientation at the
outset by saying that “[t]he purpose of this book is to compare different solutions adopted
by nine industrialized countries to common problems of income tax design.”237 Here too,
local specialists were asked to provide accounts of their home tax systems. Ault and
Arnold then synthesized the country reports into a form of general analysis which
categorizes the findings.

They, too, recognize legal “family resemblances” among

different jurisdictions which belong to parent legal traditions.238 Ault and Arnold's work
233
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primarily reveals the “many communalities”239 among the systems compared, thus again
providing some form of common core.
However, there are two important differences vis-a-vis the IFA Cahiers. First, the
scope: while the Cahiers cover narrowly-defined issues in a rather technical way, Ault
and Arnold try to establish a general picture of tax systems encompassing the legislative
process, administration, adjudication, and legal interpretation. Such research certainly
provides a “more nuanced understanding of how to approach the income tax in each
country than is produced by a mere description of tax rules.”240 This is related to the
second important difference: namely, that local experts were asked to go beyond a mere
description of the respective tax laws; they also provided an account of the history and
sources of tax law, the legislative process, constitutional considerations, tax process and
administration, the role of adjudication, and so on. This is reminiscent of Sacco's legal
formants approach. In sum, from a methodological perspective, while the IFA Cahiers
can be regarded as the “tax-duplicate” of Schlesinger's project, Ault and Arnold's work is
something like a small scale Tax-Trento-Project.
Garbarino is a rare example of a comparative tax scholar whose position is very
clear on this matter. I criticize Garbarino in relative detail in Part IV of the article, so for
now I will only make some short observations regarding his approach. We have already
noted Garbarino's advocacy for the functional approach. But Garbarino goes further than
simply suggesting such an approach. He specifically advocates the use of both the
common core and the legal formants approaches for purpose of comparative taxation.
Interestingly, he also advocates the use of comparative law and economics, asserting that
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“the institutional approach can be used in a comparative taxation to consider operative
tax rules in a context in which alternative solutions can be readily compared in
connection with their costs.”241
At first glance, Thuronyi's Comparative Tax Law looks like another clear-cut case
as it purports to deal “with core common knowledge that any well-informed lawyer
should have."242 More precisely, he tries to “identify the key elements of legal traditions
for tax law.”243 This, by definition, is an attempt to discover common cores. Thuronyi is
also sensitive to formants-related issues noting the “divergent interests” of multiple actors
which affect the tax process.244 Yet, when explaining his “comparative method,”245
Thuronyi resorts to an extreme form of eclecticism and notes that historical, sociological,
and economic methods are all relevant to the study of tax law.246 Unfortunately, he does
not provide any guidelines on how to choose methods for tax comparison and we are left
to guess.
Barker, as you recall, suggested “viewing the concepts of income taxation from an
ideological perspective.”247 This represents a shift away from the supposedly apolitical
stance of functionalism. Yet Barker does not reject functionalism altogether; instead, he
makes it self-aware. He questions the functions of tax systems in promoting distributive
justice: 248
The critical assumptions or presuppositions underlying the legal discourse of
income taxation in the world today are the general economic definitions of the
241
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income tax base. The starting place for most tax policy discussions is the
accretion concept of income and what is now known as the comprehensive
income base.249

In other words, Barker provides a benchmark for comparison: “the accretion
concept.” Barker also makes it clear that by “accretion concept” he refers to the SchanzHaig-Simons model.250 Thus, Barker’s technique can be associated with a reformed
version of comparative law and economics. He offers an economic model (Schanz-HaigSimons) to be used as a reference point for the identification of similarities and
differences among tax systems. Yet, unlike Mattei's approach, Barker’s comparative
analysis is aimed at distributive justice rather than efficiency.
Given Infanti's critical stance towards functionalism, it is not surprising that he
starts out with his comparative tax analysis by rejecting the five-step approach suggested
by Zweigert and Kötz.251 Instead, he adopts Kamba's general scheme of description,
identification, and explanation.252 As we have already noted, one has to fill Kamba's
model with some practical content in order to transform it from an abstract scheme into a
workable technique. Yet, it seems that Infanti fails to do so. Instead, he basically restates
Kamba's assertion. In his descriptive phase, Infanti suggests that the studied tax rules
should be described in “their historical and cultural context.”253 In the identification
phase the rules are to “be compared and constructed in an effort to identify any
249
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similarities among them and differences between them.”254 And in the explanation phase
the results are “employed as a framework for developing an appropriate rule for
enactment by the United States.”255
It is obvious that Infanti went to great length to provide a full account of the
relevant laws in each jurisdiction as well as the pertinent historical development and
political discourse that surrounded the creation of these rules. In that sense, Infanti’s
approach is simple and complicated at the same time. It is simple because deducting a
practical rule from his descriptive work would be to study the laws and contexts of the
foreign jurisdictions. It is complicated because this is indeed a daunting task, and Infanti
is not entirely clear as to how it should be performed. His explanatory phase is rather
short and unexpectedly “mainstream,”

given his usual critical stand. Instead of

deconstructing the findings to expose the political interest underlying them, as a truly
critical writer would, he places the jurisdictions along an imaginary spectrum of possible
choices.256 Instead of deconstructing abstract notions, he constructs them. It is a puzzle
that after attacking the mainstream discourse of tax reform in the United States, he brings
his comparative findings straight back into the framework of this mainstream discourse,
assessing the possible comparative solutions in terms of “efficiency, fairness, the
competitiveness of U.S. multinationals, the impact on political relations with foreign
countries, the need to raise revenue, and the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion.”257
The reason for such ambivalence is perhaps that, at the time when Infanti outlined his
approach, his identity as a critical scholar was not fully shaped. Infanti, in his own words,
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was probably a “closet” tax-crit not yet ready to be exposed.258 Luckily for us, since then
Infanti has made his critical position quite clear, enriching our comparative tax
environment with a truly critical comparatist.
A further shift away from traditional functionalist techniques of comparison can
be observed in Livingston's scholarship. Livingston's starting point is that:
[c]omparative taxation . . . inevitably focuses attention of the problems of tax
culture and the ways in which different country's tax systems may be extremely
different from one another, even if they face the same problems.259

As in the case of the cultural branch in general comparative law, when reading
Livingston's work, it is hard to put into practical terms what exactly it is that a cultural
tax comparatist should do. But I doubt that Livingston, as a true cultural comparatist,
would find it desirable to put the notion of tax culture into a generalized dogmatic
scheme. That said, Livingston is aware of the fact that one cannot perform a successful
comparative tax culture study without meticulous attention to the definition of culture.260
Hence he provides some guidelines for the possible components of tax cultures and their
comparisons.
Livingston’s quest for the identification of tax cultures starts by affirming that
usually, narrow and localized factors play a more important role than “broad cultural
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norms which are often subject to misleading or over-stated stereotypes.”261 Thus, within
the framework of the Cottorrell-Friedman debate, it seems that Livingston is more
inclined towards Friedman's suggestions that cultures are best understood as a general
category from which narrow indicators are devised. For example, some of the possible
components considered by Livingston in from Milan to Mumbai are:
the education and training of tax elites; the relationship between

lawyers,

economists, and other tax professionals; the nature of tax administration; attitudes
toward tax compliance and evasion; and the unwritten traditions that govern the
making and implementation of tax policy in the country in question.262

Livingston's scholarship also contains some critical elements. But unlike most
general comparatists who aim this critique at the process of comparison itself, Livingston
is critical at the level of each jurisdiction. He deconstructs local tax discourse in the
countries studied, noting that within each “there is a pronounced tendency for tax
arguments to become an argument about something else.” In other words, his cultural
project is aimed at exposing the different underlying—sometimes hidden—local factors
which effect tax outcomes and compares them.
This brief survey of the wide array of methodologies used by tax comparatists
demonstrates the eclectic nature of the field. In and of itself, such eclecticism in not
necessarily a bad thing. It our context, however, it is because the form of eclecticism
which currently controls the field means that true discourse is missing. With no
discourse, tax comparatists have failed to develop any meaningful form of guidance to
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explain which method is to be used and when. Thus, any prospective comparative tax
researcher in search of a methodology is necessarily left confused. Some guidance is
badly needed if we want to overcome this confusion.

IV. TAKING SIDES: QUESTIONING GARBARINO'S APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE TAXATION
A. In General
It is easy to criticize tax comparatists for not talking to each other and to
challenge them to do so. But one must hold to his own propositions. If no one talks to
each other, someone should start a conversation and, since I pointed out this failure in the
first place, it is only fitting that this someone should be me.
I will take sides in this yet to be implemented discourse by presenting my reaction
to Carlo Garbarino's recent article.263 Garbarino begins by introducing the purpose of his
essay: to have comparative tax studies absorb the insights of the general comparative law
debate, and to use such insights to formulate the methods applicable to comparative tax
law.264 Garbarino introduces the current discourse in general comparative law in a rather
simplistic way,265 and immediately turns to adopt the functional approach for purpose of
comparative taxation.
Garbarino misses the opportunity to refer to important works by other tax
comparatists. As we have seen, functionalist positions towards comparative tax law have
been adopted as early as the 1950s by John Chommie and practiced ever since by
comparatists such as Hugh Ault and Victor Thuronyi. Moreover, other writers have
263
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rejected the functional approach for the purpose of comparative tax studies. His failure to
consider previous scholarship enables Garbarino to imply that current comparative tax
scholarship is a “technique,” consisting of merely “collecting legislative materials of
different tax systems.”266 In fact, as noted throughout this Article, it is hard to find any
tax comparatist who treats tax comparison as a mere juxtaposition of tax rules. Thus, the
basis for Garbarino’s unconvincing argument is a rather simplistic presentation of the
wide array of ideological choices and their respective methodological counterparts.
Garbarino summarizes his approach in four points: (1) tax systems should be studied as
"wholes," (2) comparative taxation must adhere to the functional approach, (3)
comparative taxation should concentrate on legal transplants, and (4) be viewed as the
result of the circulation of models among different countries.267 Let us take a look at these
points in turn.

B. The "Tax Systems as a Whole" Myth
At the outset of his article Garbarino opines that “taxation can only be understood
in connection with a global approach which addresses the operation of the legal system as
whole.”268

He explains that “comparative tax studies should not be limited to isolated

aspects but should consider tax systems as complex evolutionary structures.”269
Here, Garbarino clearly suggests the macro-analysis of tax systems. It is my first
observation that Garbarino does not follow his own suggestion. In a later article,
Garbarino offers a comparative analysis of what he calls "corporate tax models" in order
266
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to explain how corporate tax innovation is a “result of tax competition.”270 This approach
hardly coincides with the idea to study tax systems “as a whole” as it compares a specific
area of tax law. Garbarino himself notes that “we look here at the competition of specific
tax structures and not of tax systems as a whole.”271 Even though he makes his stance
quite clear, he does not explain his sudden shift from macro to micro-analysis.
This lack of coherence can perhaps be explained by the fact that Garbarino's
initial choice of macro-comparison is unconvincing. Garbarino supports his suggestion
for macro analysis by citing David Gerber and Mathias Reimann, 272 but in doing so, he
misinterprets both. Gerber, as Garbarino suggests, indeed advances a new form of
comparative thinking, aimed at gaining what he calls “generalizable knowledge.’273
However, Gerber's quest for “generalization” has nothing to do with macro-comparison,
but rather with an attempt to put comparative knowledge into a cohesive methodological
context. Gerber is unhappy with the fact that comparative legal knowledge “tends to
remain particular, specific—and isolated.”274 This is presumably what Garbarino means
when he writes that “comparative tax studies should not be limited to isolated aspects.”
This is exactly what Gerber seeks to remedy—he strives to develop a general method to
pursue such knowledge effectively.275 Garbarino correctly reads Gerber's suggestion that
in order to accomplish such a goal, legal comparatists must turn their focus towards the
process, or the dynamics of legal systems “to interpret what legal actors have done and
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predict what they are likely to do.”276 But unlike Garbarino, Gerber does not suggest that
the study of such a process must adhere to the investigation of systems as “wholes.”
Actually, Gerber expresses quite the opposite view. He looks at the objects of
comparison and advances the use of “analytically useful concepts.” One of the criteria
that make concepts analytically useful is that “[t]hey will have to refer to specific
behavior, so that the analysis can be grounded in observable data.”277 Accordingly,
comparisons must look at specific rather than generalized variables.
Of course, Gerber seeks to develop a concept of “legal systems,” 278 but he
specifically rejects the idea of legal systems as “the totality of factors involving law in a
particular jurisdiction.”279 Rather, he seeks to “define 'legal system' in a way that is both
operationally grounded . . . and broad enough to capture the full range of factors
involved.”280 In other words, Gerber would probably advocate the study of particular
issues only if they were to shed light on the broader picture of law in a specific
jurisdiction. Interestingly enough, Gerber-like suggestions resonate loudly in the
comparative tax scholarship of Livingston and Barker, which receives little attention
from Garbarino.
Reimann, like Gerber, notes the lack of a coherent theoretical framework in
comparative legal studies, complaining that “comparative law keeps accumulating
knowledge in a piecemeal fashion but then leaves the pieces scattered, fragmentary and
often difficult to access.”281 Reimann believes that the first step towards remedying that
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malaise is to establish a canon which will provide “a common ground on which ideas
connect, the center around which knowledge can be organized, and the launching pad
from which further research starts.”282 But he also asserts specifically that such a canon
should be established on the basis of existing accumulated knowledge. 283 Since such
knowledge is accumulated by means of, among others, micro-comparisons, I see no
urgent call in Reimann's writing for a macro-analysis. When outlining possible goals for
successful comparative research, Reimann stresses goals which can be achieved by
micro-analysis side-by-side with goals which can be achieved by macro-analysis.284 By
doing so, Reimann rejects—by implication—the idea that a comparatists must look at
legal systems as a "whole."
This skepticism towards macro-analysis for tax purposes is further strengthened if
one questions this approach within the context of the peculiar nature of tax law.
Garbarino defines three unique characteristics: rapid change, complexity, and
heterogeneity of concepts.285 Most relevant for the micro/macro question is the
observation that tax law is highly complex. If, as Garbarino notes, tax law shows
“remarkable variations involving interactions between statutes, administrative guidelines,
case law and opinions of scholars,” how can we address such a combination of
complexities as “a whole?” There may be some unifying explanation that could bring
sense and coherence to this “mishmash of complexities” (for example, unique cultural
characteristics). But we would be unable to find such consistencies if we were to reduce
multiple complexities to abstract systemic notions.
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Ultimately, the incredible complexity of tax laws would force us to deconstruct
“tax systems” into components. First, because there is no possible way we can reduce
such an overly elaborate body of law into abstract terms that would do it justice. Even in
a technical sense, studying tax systems as “a whole” is simply impractical. Second, even
if we accept Garbarino's functional stance, the fact remains that tax systems perform a
multiplicity of functions. Consolidating them all into some single unit to be used as an
object of comparison would necessitate the preference of some functions over others. So
how should one define the “whole” unit? According to which tax rules? According to
definitions of tax base or according to tax expenditures? According to rules supporting
corporate reorganizations or to rules which give preferential treatment to

medical

expenses? The only guidance proposed by Garbarino in this matter is a call for
eclecticism. I further discuss Garbarino’s eclectic stance below.

C. Is the Functional Approach Adequate for the Purposes of Comparative Tax Law?
In his article, Garbarino adopts the functional approach for the study of
comparative tax law. While I do not necessarily reject functionalism in comparative tax
studies, I cannot accept it in the form advanced by Garbarino. His form of functionalism
is flawed in three different aspects. First, Garbarino almost completely ignores the longstanding critique of functionalism as a general method of comparative legal research.
Such lack of engagement puts the integrity of his arguments at risk.
Second, there is the question whether functionalism is adequate as a method of
comparative legal research in public law. Garbarino himself notes that “comparative
studies have long focused primarily on private law while public law and especially
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taxation are relatively unexplored.”286 If so, we must question whether functionalism, a
method which was predominantly used for the comparative study of private law,
necessarily fits the study of public law, such as tax rules. In fact, it was argued that the
presumption of similarities—the central pillar of functionalism—does not apply to public
law and, as a result, not to tax law. Rather, “the vast majority of the law taught at the
universities, applied by courts, and . . . examined by comparative lawyers is not caught by
the presumption.”287 This difficulty with the functional approach was noted by tax
comparatists and yet it is largely ignored by Garbarino.288
This brings us directly to the third criticism, i.e., to questioning the functional
approach specifically in light of the unique nature of tax law. Garbarino explains his
choice of the functional approach as the only one fit to overcome the obstacles to
comparing tax rules. For example, he notes the heterogeneity of tax concepts, stating that
“[t]he problem with tax concepts is that they can often not be compared directly as they
are not readily convertible into each other. In certain cases, similar terms do not have an
identical legal meaning while in other contexts, different terms may mean the same.”289
Taking such an assertion at face-value, we might accept that functional analysis is indeed
a good way to proceed since it posits the legal problem in factual rather than conceptual
terms. But this is true only if we accept that tax law is completely detached from local
contexts. Garbarino overlooks that such “heterogeneity of tax concepts” might be the
result of divergent cultural or sociological factors, rather than

simple linguistic

differences. How would we pose the Saudi Arabian "Zakat" in functional terms
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understandable to a U.S. taxpayer? How should we explain the function of rent
imputation in Belgian tax law to an American homeowner who is indifferent to concepts
of imputation? How should we deconstruct “progressivity” into comparable functional
notions? Is it intended to accomplish distributive justice? If so, how should we define it?
Should we limit the impact of redistribution to wage earners, like in Italy? Should it be
placed to promote Zionist social ideologies, like in Israel? Or is it perhaps intended to
benefit the agricultural sector, like in India?290
Tax law is very much about local context. It is the very essence of the political
orientation of any regime in any given jurisdiction. Significantly, unlike some other areas
of law, this politicized characteristic of taxation is clearly evident. There is no need to
take a critical position or to “deconstruct texts” to understand the ultra-politicized nature
of taxation. Tax law is used expressly to promote political agendas. Political candidates
run their electoral campaigns on tax-reform tickets. For example, the Obama
administration’s suggestion to repel the check-the-box regulations,291 frequently used by
U.S. multinationals to defer their tax payments and to generate foreign tax credits, would
have been unheard of under a Republican administration. It has been said that “[e]ven
conservative tax scholars recognize the inherently political nature of their subject.” 292 So
how is it that tax law is not strictly embedded in local contexts? Critical comparatists
have been subject to criticism for their attempt to “politicize” an already politicized
field.293 Garbarino actually does the opposite: he is trying to depoliticize what is clearly

290

Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, supra note 41.
John D. McKinnon & Jesse Drucker, Firms Face New Tax Curbs, WSJ.COM, May 4, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124140022601982149.html.
292
Livingston, Radical Scholars, Conservative Field, supra note 55, at 1798.
293
Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Critical Legal Studies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 26, at 815.
291

71

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1404323

political.
Moreover, even if we accept the premise that one should adhere to the functional
approach in comparative tax studies, the question still remains, which functional
approach? Functional analysis is not a coherent instrument of research, but rather an
inclusive term which encompasses multiple sub-schools of thought.294 Garbarino's
answer is that “comparative tax research should be eclectic as to the methods available
under a functional approach.”295 But Garbarino refrains from questioning whether
eclecticism is desirable at all, which in his case is especially needed since he seeks to
provide us with a coherent framework for the comparative study of tax laws. One must
explain how eclecticism is to be made coherent. As eloquently put by David Kennedy:
“As an argumentative or rhetorical effect . . . methodological eclecticism is unstable, the
argumentative apparatus which supports it is full of elisions, ambiguities, hidden
contradictions, understatements and overstatements which can be, and often are, the
object of criticism, often from other comparatists.”296 In addition, an eclectic posture
facilitates a lack of methodological commitment, i.e., it promotes “methodological
disengagement.”297

Such disengagement, in turn, enables comparatists to portray

themselves as apolitical actors, thus avoiding scrutiny and critique.
Yet, in order to correct the shortcomings of eclecticism, there is no need to reject
eclectic methodology altogether. Instead, methodological eclecticism can indeed be
justified as a paradigm.298 But in order to do so, one must disconnect eclecticism from
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vagueness and from lack of ideological commitment. Instead, comparatists should
“pursue political projects . . . harnessing their mature eclectic pragmatism to political
objectives which can be embraced or contested.”299 Eclecticism, as proposed by
Garbarino, does not achieve this goal. Since it lacks clearly stated objectives, Garbarino's
eclecticism is precisely the form of disengagement which Kennedy tries to avoid—the
kind of eclecticism which forestalls, rather than advances, a fruitful academic discourse,
as it allows comparatists to avoid critical discussion simply by saying that they pursue
different goals.

D. Legal Transplants, Legal Formants and the Common Core in Tax Contexts
Putting his functional orientation into practical terms, Garbarino suggests
adopting Sacco's legal formants approach in order to study the circulation of tax
transplants. As a substantive matter, this is not objectionable, but Garbarino reduces the
formants approach to a quasi-formal, all-legal and, by implication, ethnocentric method
of research. Specifically, he observes that “within the Western tax tradition, basically five
groups are involved in this process: legislators, tax authorities, (tax) courts, practicing
lawyers, and legal scholars.”300 The obvious problem with such an assertion is that it
provides no guidance as to which tax formants we should explore when studying nonWestern jurisdictions. The probable outcome would be narrowly-focused research from a
jurisdictional perspective, meaning that by providing methodological guidance that is
applicable to Western jurisdictions alone, non-Western jurisdictions run the risk of being
neglected in future research.
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The second reductive characteristic is that Garbarino’s formants are limited to
actors who can be formally recognized as legal professionals. Yet, the legal formants
approach has long advanced beyond looking strictly at legal actors to explain the
“making of law.” The European Common Core Approach specifically addresses metalegal formants by asking its participants to consider “policy considerations, economic
and/or social factors, social context and values, and the structure of the legal process.”301
The modern formants approach takes into account local considerations that are not
strictly legal, while Garbarino seeks to keep tax law out of its unavoidably local context.
This delocalization helps Garbarino reach his conclusion that the study of tax
transplants shows how they lead to convergence.302 This may be the case in some
instances, but certainly not always. Given the contradicting arguments—specifically in
the field of comparative tax scholarship—Garbarino's assertion calls for further analysis.
We already noted Infanti's arguments, which are specifically aimed at maintaining
divergence in an environment of legal transplants. More recently, questioning the
transplantation of British tax rules in Mandatory Palestine, Assaf Likhovski has
convincingly shown that tax transplantation does not escape local contextualization in the
receiving jurisdictions.303 Thus, even in transplantation local context plays an important
role. Some have considered this role so important that it completely alters the original
configuration of the transplanted rule, turning it into a completely new animal.304 If this is
indeed the case, then we must revisit the “transplants = convergence” thesis.
My main critique of Garbarino's operational suggestions is his adoption of
301
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Schlesinger's common core approach for the purpose of comparative tax studies.305 He
maintains that “the comparative tax scholar interested in revealing deep structures of
convergence should adopt a common core approach.”306 In support he cites Pierre
Legrand.307 But Legrand clearly states that “legal systems . . . have not been converging,
are not converging and will not be converging.”308 I would cautiously guess that
Legrand—who portrays himself as a "difference engineer"309—would probably reject
most of Garbarino's ideas.
But my objection here is more substantive. I believe that the underlying
assumptions of the common core approach are not applicable to comparative tax studies,
at least not to the same extent as in private law. For the task of unearthing a common
core of legal rules, one needs to believe that there is indeed such a common core to
unearth. In the case of private law in Europe, this is not an unreasonable assumption. For
hundreds of years, legal practices and ideas have circulated within the continent through
legal transplantations. In such a situation, it is possible to accept that a “common core,”
which transcends apparent differences, was formed during centuries-long processes of
legal borrowing. However, this assumption is doubtful in comparative tax studies.
Individual income taxation, in its modern form, is barely 200 years old. Taxation of
corporate entities dates back about a hundred years. VAT—now widely adopted across
the globe is—merely sixty years old and thus, on the scale of legal history, still an infant.
It is much harder to believe that in such a short time countries were able to distill a true,
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stable, and broad “common core” of tax rules. Assuming that there is a competitive
market for tax structures, it seems that these structures are still competing and undergoing
constant scrutiny.
Garbarino

notes that one of the unique characteristics of tax legislation, as

compared to other areas of law, is its unbelievably fast pace of change. This is the
clearest comment that there is no common core of taxation, or at best a very narrow one.
Tax law is a new historical phenomenon. Even if we accept the assumption that tax law is
an autonomous body of law, free from contextualization, it is still in search of its true
common core. Had tax law found its so-called “core,” meaningful legislative changes
would not occur as often as it does. Something that changes so rapidly is probably not yet
a "core" but may be better understood as an experimental form of law.

V. CONCLUSION: NOW, CAN WE TALK?
The argument presented in this Article is straight forward, and can be summarized
in David Gerber's critique of comparative law in general:
Gains in knowledge produced by a member of the community are not part of a shared
project that renders that knowledge usable by others. As a result, there is little basis
for community among those applying the method. There is, in other words, little room
for “science” if one understands science to be a process by which a community seeks
to create new knowledge that is useful to its members. 310

Unlike general comparative legal studies, where scholars have at least attempted to
engage each other's ideas, tax comparatists simply ignore each other. In essence,
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comparative taxation serves as an extreme example for the methodological incoherence
that characterizes general comparative legal studies. To date, there is no debate regarding
the purposes of comparative taxation, and as long as we do not start questioning those
purposes, there is little use in discussing methodologies. And if we do not discuss
methodologies, we will encounter difficulties when evaluating each other's research.
Under such conditions, the production of comparative tax knowledge can be regarded as
a somewhat miraculous event. We comparative tax scholars must begin a meaningful
discussion and should begin by utilizing the long established schools of thought in
comparative law as rallying points.
Michael Livingston once rightfully stated that “a field in which everyone is shouting
at each other is likely to come to no good.”311 I would like to add that a field in which no
one even talks to each other is unlikely to produce any better results. So by all means,
let's talk!
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